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The existing military retirement system of the Department of Defense (DoD) has 
come under ever-increasing scrutiny in recent years.  While there are many reasons given 
for the increased interest, most stem from concerns over the cost of the existing defined 
benefit system.  The migration of most civilian organizations and federal employees to a 
defined contribution plan vice a defined benefit plan further enhances interest in why the 
military has not followed suit.  There is also a concern that the current system, under 
which benefits commence immediately upon retirement, is no longer in the best interest 
of the taxpayer or the DoD.  A review of the objectives of the military retirement system 
and analyses of how well the objectives are being met naturally follows given the current 
push for a more cost efficient military as a whole.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to clearly define the objectives of the military 
retirement system and analyze the degree to which these objectives are met by the current 
retirement system.  Once this has been done, one has a strong footing with which to 
consider alternative retirement options and to evaluate to what degree these options could 
meet the stated objectives.  This can be done with an end goal of developing the best 
possible system for meeting the stated objectives.  Once this retirement system has been 
found, one must then consider the costs and benefits of transitioning to this new system.  
This research has done that through the development of a simulation model for 
forecasting the cost savings/loss from adopting a program other than the current model. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The primary question that this thesis addresses is:  Given the current 
objectives of the DoD retirement system; can the needs of both the DoD and today’s 
potential military entrants be better met by development of a new multi-option type 
retirement system than by the current defined benefit system? 
2 
Secondary questions that have been addressed include the following: 
• What are the objectives of the retirement system and does the current 
system meet them? 
• How would a multi-option retirement system be structured to meet the 
objectives of the DoD retirement? 
• What, if any, cost savings can be attained by implementing the 
aforementioned multi-option retirement system? 
• What effect would the transition to a new retirement system have on 
personnel accessions as well as retention? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis includes an inspection and evaluation of the stated objectives of the 
military retirement system.  Once the objectives have been clearly defined, one can more 
intelligently evaluate the effectiveness of the current retirement system at meeting the 
objectives and identify areas for potential improvement.  Armed with a thorough 
understanding of the objectives and the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
retirement system, one is then prepared to evaluate/develop alternative retirement plans.  
Based on findings from analysis of previously recommended retirement options, or 
versions of those options, this thesis develops a multi-option type retirement system that, 
in theory, will better meet the stated objectives of the retirement system.  The thesis then 
provides a simulation type model to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the existing and 
newly developed model and provides analytical results of the potential cost and benefit 
differences between the two systems.  Based on an understanding of the objectives and 
model output one can then make an informed decision as to whether or not the new 
model should be considered for incorporation or if the existing system better meets the 
objectives. 
Because of the complexity and immense size of the military pay system, this 
thesis looks only at the entitlements that directly affect the retirement system.  While 
recognizing that some individuals feel the objectives of the military retirement system 
need to be modified, this thesis assumes the current objectives are a solid base upon 
which to build a new retirement system.  The validity of this assumption is based on the 
objectives having withstood numerous past reviews with little noteworthy change. 
3 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology relied heavily on data gathered by a review of previous 
private and government funded studies of the military and civilian sector retirement 
plans.  Further data were gathered from congressional and senior military member 
testimony as well as printed data and Internet resources.  The model developed to 
compare the existing and newly developed plans incorporates a “Monte Carlo” type 
simulation to reach statistically significant results.  Based on the information in the 
evaluation, development, and simulation phase, recommendations for modification of, or 
changes to, the military retirement system are made. 
 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
 This thesis utilizes seven chapters to present the analysis in an organized manner.  
An overview of the chapters follows: 
 
1. Chapter I  
Chapter I discusses the background reasoning for performance of this study as 
well as defining what the purposes of the study are and how they will be accomplished. 
 
2. Chapter II 
Chapter II examines the existing objectives of the DoD military retirement 
system.  The examination includes a discussion of the objectives with respect to the 
following areas: promotion, general competitiveness with civilian counterparts, overall 
manpower control, and reasonableness of cost.  A discussion of the key elements of each 
area and why they are important to the overall military mission is included. 
 
3. Chapter III 
Chapter III gives the background of the existing retirement system.  This 
discussion includes the costs and benefits the system offers the military as well as some 
criticisms, both long-standing and recent.  The current system is then evaluated against 
4 
the objectives detailed in Chapter II to determine to what degree the existing system and 
the objectives are aligned. 
 
4. Chapter IV 
Chapter IV discusses various retirement plan options offered for DoD 
consideration by both government and non-government entities.  The plans are 
summarized and evaluated against the objectives to determine the degree to which they 
would be feasible for consideration as a new DoD retirement plan.  An evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the plans is also given. 
 
5. Chapter V 
Chapter V encompasses the discussion and analysis utilized when considering 
how to best develop a multi-option retirement system.  Data from previous chapters, such 
as plan strengths and weaknesses as well as alignment with the objectives, were 
integrated for consideration when developing the new plan.  The final product is a multi-
option retirement system that better meets the objectives of the military retirement system 
and the needs/desires of today’s potential military accessions. 
 
6. Chapter VI 
Chapter VI gives a background into why the simulation model is appropriate for 
use as an analysis tool in this instance as well as defining the assumptions that are 
inherent to the model.  An understanding of the assumptions made and limitations on 
input variability are critical if one hopes to get meaningful and accurate results from 
running the simulation.  This model is then used to compare the costs and benefits of the 
existing military retirement system and the one developed in chapter V. 
 
7. Chapter VII 
Chapter VII summarizes the findings of the thesis and makes recommendations 
for and against changing the existing retirement system.  A discussion of the pros and 
cons to change are included as well as answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 
5 
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II. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE DOD MILITARY RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DOD MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES 
A discussion of the validity of the current DoD military retirement system or any 
proposed changes to the retirement system cannot be meaningful without first 
understanding the objectives and purposes on which the system is based.  There are many 
entities, both governmental and private, that have offered recommendation on 
modifications to, and/or complete restructuring of, the existing retirement system.  One 
theme consistent to nearly all of the studies is an adherence to the stated objectives that 
the DoD retirement system is tasked with achieving.  The objectives are based on the 
military retirement system meeting the needs of both the nation and its military service 
members.  Some studies have challenged the applicability and validity of the objectives, 
but all attempts at changing them have been thwarted.  We will now discuss the 
objectives that lay the groundwork for the remainder of the thesis. 
The DoD, via the Office of the Actuary, annually produces a report, Valuation of 
the Military Retirement System, which defines the DoD’s perspective on the principles 
that guide the military retirement system’s purpose and evolution: 
The principle motivations guiding the evolution of the military retirement 
system have been to ensure that (1) continued service in the armed forces 
is competitive with the alternatives, (2) promotion opportunities are kept 
open for young and able members, (3) some measure of economic security 
is made available to members after retirement from a military career, (4) a 
pool of experienced personnel is available for recall in times of war or 
national emergency, and (5) the costs of the system are reasonable. (Ref. 1 
p. B-2) 
8 
A second source of data for the basis of the military retirement system is the 
Military Compensation Background Papers produced by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.  A review of the papers reveals the following objectives: 
• The provision of a socially acceptable level of payments to former 
members of the armed forces during their old age. 
• The provision of a pool of experienced military manpower that can be 
called upon in time of war or other national emergency to augment the 
active duty forces of the United States. 
• The provision of a retirement system that will enable the armed forces to 
remain generally competitive with private-sector employers and the 
federal civil service. 
• The provision of a socially acceptable means of keeping the military 
forces of the United States young and vigorous, thereby insuring 
promotion opportunities for the younger members (Ref. 2 p. 50) 
The objectives of the military retirement system have remained nearly unchanged 
over time even with the level of attention and subsequent changes that the retirement 
system has undergone in recent years.  Reviewing the findings of the Fifth Quadrennial 
Review of Military Compensation, (QRMC) completed in 1984 reveals the following 
objectives. (Ref 8, p. IV-1) 
The fundamental purpose of the Uniformed Services retirement system, 
strongly supported by the Fifth QRMC, is to support and complement the 
manpower force management requirements of the Services in order to 
meet national security objectives.  It is designed to help ensure that the 
following vital needs are fulfilled: 
1. To maintain young, vigorous and mission-ready forces capable of 
operating efficiently both in peace and war by providing for a 
continuing flow of officers and enlisted personnel through the 
Services’ required personnel structures. 
2. To Establish the choice of a career in the Uniformed Services as a 
reasonably competitive alternative by providing a measure of financial 
security after release from active or reserve duty (retirement) for 
service members and their survivors. 
3. To support a mobilization base of experienced personnel subject to 
recall to active duty during time of war or national emergency. 
9 
The wording of the three sets of objectives is not identical, but the overall 
intentions are very well aligned.  One can see from these lists that the military retirement 
system is not solely intended for use as a basis for paying retired service members a 
pension.  The system must also serve as a manpower control tool as well as being socially 
acceptable in terms of benefits provided to the retiree and cost to the taxpayer.  Also 
missing from these sources is how the objectives are to be realized.  The objectives, while 
consistent in content in all three documents, are just the end goals.  This leaves the task of 
determining how to best meet the requirements of the objectives and that of the nation to 
the retirement system developer/implementer, in this case the DoD. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES 
 
1. Providing for the Economic Needs of the Retired 
The objective of paying or rewarding retired employees at an equitable rate for 
services rendered while employed is common to all retirement systems.  The military 
retirement system differs from civilian counterparts in that the amount a retiree is paid is 
a matter of public record and is, in effect, paid by every taxpayer.  This makes 
determining the amount and structure of the pay a much more complex issue.  Trying to 
balance the overwhelming movement towards cost cutting and money saving that is 
ongoing in Congress today with maintaining a feasible pay rate to military retirees is an 
unenviable task.  Further, determining what life-style/enumeration that a given retiree 
should be afforded is a subject of much debate.  Maintaining the military retirement 
system payments at a competitive level with civilian and other federal service employees 
is also complicated by the perceived arduous nature and tasking of a service member’s 
job.  Further exasperating the complexity of meeting this requirement is the ongoing 
restructuring of civilian and federal civil service retirement systems.  According to the 
Investment Company Institute, a mutual fund industry trade group, private and 
government-administered defined-benefit plans made up just 24% of the retirement 
market in 2000—down from 32% in 1990. (Ref 3, p.52)  This evolution of the non-
military retirement systems makes it more difficult for one to ensure that the military 
retirement system is equitable with its non-military counterparts. 
10 
2. Allowance for Maintaining a Young and Vigorous Force Structure 
Tasking a retirement system with manpower control issues such as maintaining a 
young and vigorous force structure as well as upward mobility further increases the 
complexity of the system’s design.  The goal of having a retirement system that is not 
only attractive to prospective military members, but also aids in affording those same 
new members a realistic promotion timeline is in itself an ambitious tasking.  The system 
must not only achieve both of these aims, but also provide sufficient incentives to the 
service member to not stay on his/her job too long.  One must prioritize which of these 
facets is most important when developing the retirement system.  Ideally the system 
would be flexible enough to allow for the organization to modify it as necessary to meet 
the current manpower issues or demands.  Designing flexibility into any system increases 
the complexity of the system, but is even more daunting in the case of the military 
retirement system.  The reason that it is no small feat is that Congress must approve any 
significant changes to the military compensation system and appropriate funds to pay for 
the changes and associated costs accordingly on an annual basis. 
 
3. Maintenance of a Pool of Readily Available Personnel  
An additional objective of the military retirement system is to maintain a readily 
accessible pool of retirees available for recall in the event of a war or other national 
emergency that is beyond the capability of the current active duty forces.  While it may 
seem straightforward enough at first, determining the dollar-value of such a pool of 
personnel resources is much less clear.   Further, once the dollar-value of the pool has 
been determined one must then decide how to incorporate this value equitably into the 
retirement system.  How much should someone be paid for being “on call” for the 
remainder of his/her life?  To further complicate the matter of placing a value on this 
resource pool is the fact that, to date, we have not had to call on these people to return to 
service. The lack of use of the pool forces one to consider lessening its value, conversely, 




4. What is a Reasonable Cost to Society? 
The American taxpayers ultimately pay for the military retirement system costs.  
This places the onus of ensuring an equitable military retirement system on Congress, the 
taxpayers elected representatives.  This facet again further complicates the design of the 
military retirement system in that once the DoD has developed a system to meet the pay 
and manpower objectives it must then convince Congress to pay for it.  Congress is 
constitutionally mandated to control the “purse strings.”  Thus once the system has been 
developed to meet all of the previously discussed objectives it must also be designed such 
that the Congress can justify its cost.  In an era of cost cutting and deficit versus surplus 
budget wars, no program of any significant cost is above debate in Congress.  This is 
evidenced by the increasing frequency with which the current military retirement system 
has come under fire in Congressional debates in recent years.  No hard number exists for 
what is too much, but one must face the reality that as budget wars and cost cutting 
continue to be the way of the times, a program that cannot be fully justified will be 
reduced or eliminated.  This places a further impetus on the DoD to ensure that the 
retirement system that it promises its members can be justly defended in the halls of 
Congress during the annual budget battles. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
The objectives of the military retirement system seem simple enough when first 
encountered, but as this discussion has shown, meeting all of the objectives is not an easy 
task.  Developing a system that is in the best interest of the country and the service 
members requires a delicate balancing act.  Concepts that seem simple when considered 
alone become entangled with other considerations and requirements when one tries to put 
together a retirement system that encompasses all of the objectives.  Thus, what started 
out as two short lists of objectives have laid the groundwork for the chapters that follow.  
The thesis will next examine the existing system and discern to what degree it meets the 
objectives as described herein and then continue by evaluating various other potential 
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III. THE EXISTING MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
A brief review of the origin and evolution of the military retirement system over 
the last 150 years lays the groundwork for a detailed discussion of today’s system.  
Having laid the groundwork, the thesis will then discuss in detail the three retirement 
plans that encompass today’s military service members.  This discussion will include the 
costs and benefits of the various plans with respect to retiree entitlements, as well as an 
analysis of the three plans degree of alignment with the objectives outlined in Chapter II.  
A discussion of the Military Retirement Fund will also be undertaken to aid in the 
reader’s ability to better understand and evaluate the costs associated with today’s 
system.  The newly incorporated Thrift Savings Plan and some recurring criticisms of the 
overall retirement system will also be considered.   
 
B. RETIREMENT SYSTEM HISTORY UP TO 1980 
The roots of today’s military retirement system can be traced as far back as 1855.  
Military leaders of the time started to come to the realization that the need for some 
mechanism other than death was necessary in order to maintain a force structure that was 
physically capable of carrying out their tasking.  Until this time there was no mandatory 
or voluntary retirement system in place and as such the military ranks included many old 
and incapable personnel.  An 1855 statute was enacted giving the Secretary of the Navy 
the authority to involuntarily separate naval officers incapable of performing their duties 
through no fault of their own.  Most officers separated under the statute were retired for 
reasons of age or medical disability.  The officers were given compensation based on 
either 75% of sea duty pay (absence pay) or 50% of leave of absence pay (furlough pay). 
(Ref. 1, p. B-3)  This act set in motion the framework for the follow-on act of August 3, 
1861 that authorized officers of all branches of service an avenue for voluntary 
retirement, at the discretion of the President of the United States, after having served their 
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country for at least 40 years. (Ref 2, p. 512)  The affects of the lack of authority to 
involuntarily retire aging forces was later described in a Congressional study as follows: 
The unsatisfactory personnel conditions in the Regular Army which 
prompted these repeated recommendations of the War Department that 
Congress provide some form of retirement for the Regular Army were 
emphasized during the extended field service required over the period 
1812-1861.  While the law provided a pension of one-half pay for disabled 
officers, there existed no provision for compulsory separation from active 
service of old and disabled officers; there was no limit on active service 
save by dismissal or resignation of the officer.  Thus, an officer could 
remain on active duty until death, despite incapacity due to old age, 
physical disability, etc.  In consequence, many junior officers exercised 
commands in the field beyond their rank, the old and disabled officers 
who should have exercised these commands being left behind—often on 
leave—whenever field service was performed. (Ref. 2 p. 511)  
Over the next 50 or so years many minor modifications were made to the military 
retirement system (Ref. 2 pp. 512-521).  Then the Act of August 29, 1916 (Naval Service 
Appropriation Act of 1917) was enacted.  This act was the first to introduce the up-or-out 
concept and initiated the use of the retirement pay formula that was to be the basis for 
calculating retiree pay until 1980. As one can see from this brief historical review, the 
retirement system originally came about as a result of need for a force management tool 
(for example - age control).  While this discussion has been limited to the officer 
retirement plan the enlisted members retirement system was created and modified along a 
similar timeline and path.  Modifications of the retirement system from 1916 until 1980 
mainly encompassed making the various services’ retirement systems more equitable. 
 
C. 1980 TO THE PRESENT 
The Defense Authorization Acts of 1981, 1984, 1986, and 2000 all made 
significant changes to the military retirement system.  As is evidenced by the four major 
changes occurring in less than a twenty-year period, the system has come under heavy 
fire and criticism in recent years.  The 1981 and 1986 changes tended to lessen the value 
of the retirement system to the military member in hopes of resulting in cost savings to 
the taxpayer.  The 1984 act changed the military accounting system with respect to the 
retirement system and resulted in the creation of the Military Retirement Fund, which 
15 
ultimately resulted in making the cost of the military retirement system much more 
readily apparent.  The Defense Authorization Act of 2000 is, in effect, a partial repeal of 
the 1986 reductions to the retirement system.  It also added the Thrift Savings Plan as a 
retirement tool available to service members.  As a result of these acts, today’s active 
duty service members fall into one of following three retirement payment systems. 
 
1. Service Entry Prior to 1980 
Those members entering service prior to September 8, 1980 are covered under a 
retirement compensation plan commonly referred to as ‘Final Pay.’  The formula used for 
calculating a member’s pension benefits is based upon the final monthly base pay the 
member achieves prior to retiring. The member receives 50% of his/her final base pay for 
completion of the first 20 years of service and an additional 2.5% for each year thereafter 
with a cap set at 75% of final base pay, regardless of length of service.  Payments 
commence immediately upon the member’s retirement and continue throughout the 
retiree’s lifetime.  The retiree’s benefits are also protected against inflationary or cost of 
living increases by annually increasing at a rate equal to the annual Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) percentage.  This type of inflation protection is referred to as full CPI protection or 
cost of living adjustment (COLA).   
 
2. Service Entry between 1980 and 1986 
The Defense Authorization Act of 1981 changed the basis for calculating retiring 
military members’ compensation.  All members entering the service after August 1, 1981 
were affected by this act.  The plan, commonly referred to as ‘HI 3,’ lowers the retiree’s 
entitlement by using the mathematical average of the member’s highest 36 months of 
base pay as a basis for calculation vice just his/her final monthly base pay rate.  The 
percentage multipliers and CPI protection afforded the member are identical to the final 
pay method previously defined.  The result is a lower base pay number by which the 
applicable percentage is multiplied and thus less retirement compensation than under the 
final pay option.  
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3. Service Entry after 1986 
In enacting the Defense Authorization Act of 1986 Congress hoped to further 
reduce the cost of the military retirement system by lowering the compensation afforded 
retiring military members and at the same time mitigate the flood of military personnel 
leaving the services immediately following 20 years of service.  This plan is commonly 
referred to as ‘REDUX.’  Here we see the manpower control aspect of the retirement 
system coming into play as both a tool for the services and a political scapegoat for the 
members of Congress.  The act was intended to save money by reducing both the base 
pay multiplier and the COLA afforded the military retiree.  These adjustments were made 
based on a belief that the existing system was too generous and that by making members 
serve longer to receive benefits equitable to their predecessors, less personnel would 
retire immediately following their twentieth year of service.  It was thought that this 
would aid the military in combating retention problems, while at the same time saving the 
taxpayers money. 
A retiree’s pay under the REDUX plan is calculated by using the base pay method 
defined for the HI 3 plan but the percentage factors are lowered.  Instead of receiving 
50% of the base amount at 20 years of service a member is now entitled to only 40%.  
The per year percentage increase for each year past 20 years of service increased to 3.5% 
vice 2.5% thus members still reach the cap of 75% at 30 years of service.  The benefits 
are further reduced by the cost of living adjustments annually applied being based on the 
CPI-1% vice just the CPI.  There is an allowance for a one time ‘catch-up’ at age 62 but 
following age 62 the benefits again grow at the CPI-1% rate vice the full CPI protection 
afforded retirees under previous plans. 
 
a. The Effects of the Defense Authorization Act of 2000 
The Defense Authorization Act of 2000 took steps to repeal/offset some of 
the reductions in retirement entitlements made by the 1986 act.  The 2000 act gives 
members who originally entered the military service under the REDUX plan two options 
with respect to retirement entitlements.  The member must elect at the 15 years of service 
point which plan he/she will participate.  The first option is to revert back to the HI 3 plan 
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and receive the same benefits as personnel entering in the 1980 to 1986 timeframe.  The 
second option is to take a one time $30,000 career status bonus payment, obligate to stay 
on active duty until at least the 20 years of service (YOS) point has been reached, and 
subsequent to retiring have his/her entitlements calculated as outlined under the REDUX 
plan.  Thus no personnel actually retired under the REDUX plan alone.  The future 
economic value of the HI 3 and REDUX plan with career status bonus is a matter of 
much discussion.  Table 1 presents the retirement benefits afforded a member retiring on 
December 31, 2002 under each program for the purpose of illustrating the diminishing 
value of the benefits of the military retirement system in recent years.  The $30,000 
career status bonus is not included in the table as placing a value on the bonus requires 
many assumptions and can take many forms.  The value of the bonus and thus total 
retirement entitlements under the REDUX with Career Status Bonus plan will be 
calculated using the model presented later in the thesis.  The value of the Thrift Savings 
Plan (TSP) is not included in this table as its value is the same regardless of the 
retirement plan an individual is under.  A further discussion of the TSP and the related 
benefits follows the table. 
 
Table 1.   Comparison of Retirement System Benefits Under the Three Plans Covering 
Today’s Service Members (After: Ref. 1, 7, & 14) 
 
RANK  BASE PAY
 & YOS 2000 2001 2002
E-7 & 20 31,559$        33,106$      36,688$     
E-8 & 30 41,704$        43,351$      47,254$     
O-5 & 20 66,688$        69,484$      72,958$     
O-6 & 30 84,388$       87,718$     92,102$    
RANK  2003 PAY      % REDUCED BY CHANGE
 & YOS FINAL PAY HI 3 REDUX FINAL PAY HI 3 REDUX
E-7 & 20 18,344$          16,892$        13,514$      0% 7.9% 26.3%
E-8 & 30 35,440$          33,077$        33,077$      0% 6.7% 6.7%
O-5 & 20 36,479$          34,855$        27,884$      0% 4.5% 23.6%
O-6 & 30 69,077$          66,052$       66,052$     0% 4.4% 4.4%
RANK  2013 PAY      % REDUCED BY CHANGE
 & YOS FINAL PAY HI 3 REDUX FINAL PAY HI 3 REDUX
E-7 & 20 24,653$          22,702$        16,473$      0% 7.9% 33.2%
E-8 & 30 47,629$          44,453$        40,321$      0% 6.7% 15.3%
O-5 & 20 49,024$          46,842$        33,990$      0% 4.5% 30.7%
O-6 & 30 92,833$          88,768$       80,517$     0% 4.4% 13.3%  
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4. The Thrift Savings Plan 
The Defense Authorization Act for 2000 further enhanced the overall economic 
value of the military retirement package available to current and future service members 
by authorizing participation in the Uniformed Services Thrift Savings Plan (USTSP).  
The USTSP is modeled after the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) that was authorized for 
federal employees in 1986.  The TSP is the federal employee’s equivalent to a civilian 
sector employee’s 401K plan.  In 2002 members can contribute up to 7% of base pay and 
various other forms of entitlement pays, tax-deferred, into the TSP.  The money then 
grows tax-deferred until the member withdraws the money for use in retirement.  The 
money is then taxed at the individual’s current tax rate, which is typically lower than the 
tax rate applicable when the monies were initially earned.  The limit on how much money 
a military member can contribute is controlled by federal statute as dictated in Internal 
Revenue Code sections 402g and 415 similar to civilian plans.  Unlike most civilian 401k 
plans and the TSP for civilian employees under the Federal Employee Retirement System 
(FERS), the USTSP does not currently offer any matching funds to provide further 
incentive for the military member to participate.  While matching funds are not currently 
paid to any military members, it is worthy of note that the act authorizing the USTSP 
does allow for matching funds to be utilized as a manpower tool.  The use of matching 
funds for manpower control issues is at the discretion of the service secretaries.  Placing 
an economic value on the USTSP for the typical retiree is a complex matter as a result of 
the many assumptions that must be made regarding market performance, degree of 
participation, and member’s tax bracket information to name just a few.  The model 
developed in Chapter V incorporates these factors and may be used in placing an overall 
economic value on the plan. 
 
5. The Military Retirement Fund 
The Defense Authorization Act of 1984 changed the accounting practices utilized 
by the DoD in managing the military retirement system.  The effect of this was to go 
from a pay-as-you-go type system to one where the DoD was required to recognize, and 
subsequently budget for, future retirement costs when members initially join the service 
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vice waiting until members actually retire.  The balance and unfunded liability aspects of 
the Military Retirement Fund (MRF) made it much easier for people to readily determine 
the cost and financial status of the military retirement system.  A result of the MRF 
making it easier for anyone to relatively quickly and simply evaluate the cost of the 
retirement system has resulted in even more legislative attention being given to trying to 
lessen these costs. 
The MRF was officially established on October 1, 1984, as a result of public law 
98-94, amended Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.).  Chapter 74 outlined the MRF as 
follows: 
There is established on the books of the Treasury a fund to be known as 
the Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund (Hereafter in this 
chapter referred to as the ‘Fund’), which shall be administered by the 
secretary of Treasury.  The Fund shall be used for the accumulation of 
funds in order to finance on an actuarially sound basis, liabilities of the 
Department of Defense under military retirement and survivor benefits 
programs (Ref. 4).    
When the MRF was established it was actuarially determined to have an unfunded 
liability in the amount of $528.7 billion.  The unfunded liability was the result of no 
funds having been earmarked to pay for the retirement entitlements of currently serving 
active duty members and members that had already retired.  By design this unfounded 
liability would be paid by the Treasury department and amortized over the next 60 years.  
Thus from then forward the Treasury has made annual payments to the fund to pay for 
the unfounded liability.  The DoD is responsible for actuarially determining the potential 
liability of each new years future retirement obligations and depositing on a monthly 
basis a portion such that this liability is fully funded each year.  The only other inflow to 
the fund is that from interest and par payments on the balance of the fund that is invested 
in securities.  Since its inception, the fund’s only true outlays have been those of meeting 
the retirement obligations owed retirees and/or their survivors.  The fund invests in U.S. 
Treasury securities for investment purposes.  Figure 1 depicts the transaction cycle 




Figure 1.   The Military Retirement Fund Transaction Process (From: Ref 1, p. 26) 
 
D. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PLANS VERSUS SYSTEM DESIGN 
OBJECTIVES 
 
1. Providing for the Economic Needs of the Retired 
There is little debate, regardless of which of the three retirement plans a service 
member falls under, that the entitlements afforded the military retiree are sufficient 
compensation to meet the retiree’s economic needs as compared with those benefits 
offered comparable employees under a civilian or federal civil service retirement system.  
The argument with respect to this objective is the failure of any entitlements for 
personnel completing less than twenty years of service.  Unlike most civilian retirement 
systems, which vest employees at a maximum of 5-7 years of employment, the current 
plans available to military service members do not ‘vest’ the employee until at least 
twenty years of service have been completed.  This inequity has always been a topic of 
much discussion.  Movements to lessen the period of time required to receive retirement 
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benefits have routinely been thwarted by both the military services and Congress, arguing 
that earlier vesting would undermine the services retention efforts and simultaneously 
increase retirement system costs. 
 
2. Maintaining a Young and Vigorous Force Structure 
All current military retirement system plans require at least twenty years of 
service for a member to be entitled to retirement benefits.  A study conducted by RAND, 
A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy, found that while the existing 
system provided strong effort and retention incentive to mid-career personnel, it tended to 
reduce promotion opportunities for junior personnel and reduced effort incentive to those 
having exceeded the twenty or more years of service milestone.  (Ref, 5 p. 120)  This 
points out that while the retirement system aids in mid-career retention efforts it can 
actually be viewed as an obstacle in efforts to gain and retain new accessions, thus 
defeating much of the intent of the overall objective.  A second shortcoming is that 
personnel past the twenty-year milestone are not provided as much incentive to excel as 
prior to that point.  As is illustrated by the commonly used phraseology of a member 
being on the ‘ROAD’ (retired on active duty) program. It is also apparent that when 
retirement benefits were reduced in 1980 and again in 1986 that the reduced benefit 
packages had a significant impact on the Services’ ability to maintain the desired force 
structure. 
 
3. Maintaining a Pool of Readily Available Personnel 
The system, as currently designed, meets the requirement of maintaining a pool of 
readily available personnel.  All personnel that retire from military service today and 
receive entitlements are eligible for recall to active duty.  As this thesis is formulated on 
the basis that we will not change the existing objectives defined in Chapter II, all systems 
evaluated and/or developed by this study also encompass the associated costs and 
benefits of meeting this objective. 
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4. Is it a Reasonable Cost to Society 
What does a reasonable military retirement system cost?  There is no hard and fast 
number that one can place their finger on and say this is the value of a military retiree for 
his/her service to the country.  This fact makes what is a reasonable cost for the military 
retirement system one of much contention.  When times are good the cost is often 
ignored, but when the economy slows or deficit spending looms, any cost that cannot be 
fully justified is subject to reduction.  This happened to the military retirement system 
benefits in 1980 and again in 1986.  In the late nineteen nineties, when the national 
budget was operating at or near a surplus, the services were able to restore some of the 
military retirement system entitlements lost earlier by pleading the case that retention was 
being hindered to the point that the military was in danger of not being able to meet 
future readiness demands.  As the shift of nearly all civilian corporations to defined 
contribution vice defined benefit type retirement systems continues it will continue to get 
harder to justify the expense of the military’s defined benefit system to the American 
taxpayer.  Thus while an exact number does not exist for comparison a cheaper system 
will always have an advantage over one costing more.  Unless the military can show that 
the cost of their retirement system is as low as possible while still affording retirees their 
deserved entitlements and simultaneously meeting the manpower control objectives of 
the Service’s it will continue to be the brunt of much scrutiny.  
 
E. SUMMARY 
The military retirement system has existed in some form since 1855 and has 
evolved with the times.  It has undergone numerous changes and modifications in 
attempts to meet the needs of the military and society.  The system that exists today is 
well aligned with the objectives upon which it is based.  As with any system, it does not 
perfectly meet all of the objectives but rather is a compromise that ideally maximizes the 
extent to which the overall intent of the objectives is achieved.  This said, the cost of the 
system and the fact that the rest of society has transitioned from a defined benefit to a 
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defined contribution retirement system mentality forces one to consider whether or not it 
is time to change the military system to something more equitable with that of society as 



























IV. REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE RETIREMENT PLANS 
FOR CONSIDERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, many changes, both major and minor in scale, have been offered 
to the DoD for consideration as improvements to the existing military retirement system.  
This chapter will discuss in detail some of these options offered for consideration and 
evaluate them against the stated objectives of the retirement system.  The studies that will 
be considered are:  The President’s Commission on Military Compensation of 1978, The 
Grace Commission recommendations of 1984, The Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation Report of 1984, and The MFERS option offered by RAND in 1994.  A 
review of recommendations for overall privatization of the system will also be 
considered.  The chapter will consider some criticisms of the systems and reasons why it 
is believed that the DoD and/or Congress did not endorse and subsequently incorporate 
the recommended system or changes.  This is done to lay the groundwork for 
development of the multi-option retirement system that is discussed in chapter V. 
 
B. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON MILITARY COMPENSATION 
President Jimmy Carter formed the President’s Commission on Military 
Compensation in 1978 to evaluate and analyze the military compensation system as a 
whole for applicability to an all-volunteer military force.  In the process of studying the 
compensation system the commission spent considerable time and effort evaluating the 
military’s existing retirement system.  The commission found the existing system of 
allowing personnel to retire after twenty years of service at half of basic pay was no 
longer a justifiable program. (Ref 9, p. 2)  The basis for this finding was the growing cost 
of the retirement system. 
As an alternative, the commission recommended establishing a three-part 
noncontributory retirement plan consisting of severance pay, a trust fund, and an old age 
annuity.  The severance pay portion would be applicable only to members involuntarily 
separated after five or more years of service.  The trust fund portion was aimed at 
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strengthening retention by use of deferred compensation for members having served 10 
years or more and designed such that it could be used to ease service members’ transition 
to civilian life.  The third, and largest component, was the old-age annuity which offered 
the following features: 
• Eligibility for a deferred annuity at age 55, 60, or 62 depending on years 
of service, starting at 10 years; 
• Annuity levels similar to those earned in Federal Civil Service 
employment; 
• Partial integration of social security benefits and annuities; 
• Inflation protection; 
• Health care, exchange, and commissary benefits for most annuitants; and 
• Fully coordinated military and Civil Service retirement plans; no dual 
compensation. 
The main, and nearly immediate criticism, of the commission’s recommendation 
for the revised retirement system was that the plan was not designed to meet the 
objectives of the DoD’s retirement system.  Further criticism of the plan was based on the 
fact that offering retirement compensation to individuals having served less than twenty 
years of service increased system costs while concurrently hindering the services’ 
retention abilities and their ability to encourage member separation at the desired point.  
Thus while the system would theoretically lower costs it would not meet the manpower 
control objectives desired of the military retirement system.  The system was never acted 
upon by Congress and thus never went into effect. 
 
C. GRACE COMMISSION PROPOSALS 
President Ronald Reagan formed the President’s Private Sector Survey (PPSS) in 
1984.  The PPSS is more commonly referred to as the Grace Commission.  The Grace 
Commission was tasked with reducing government costs and inefficiencies.  As a part of 
their study the commission evaluated the military retirement system and made the 
following change recommendations: 
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1. Service members that complete 20 years of service would only 
receive full and unreduced annuities at age 62 unlike the existing system 
under which annuity payments commence upon retirement regardless of 
age. 
2. The formula for calculating military retirement pay would use a 
reduced multiplier of 1.6 percent of the Basic Military Compensation 
(BMC).  BMC is equivalent to basic pay, allowance for quarters, 
subsistence, and the tax advantages that arise from these allowances, 
which is about the equivalent of 2.1 percent of basic pay.  Retirement pay 
would also be based on the average of the highest five years of pay vice 3 
as it is now based. 
3. The share of Social Security benefits attributable to service would 
reduce retirement pay. 
4. COLAs for retirees would be reduced to the lower of the 
percentage of the CPI or the percentage change in BMC.  After the retiree 
reaches his 62nd birthday and becomes eligible for Social Security, the 
COLA increase would be reduced to only one third of the CPI increase. 
5. The Grace commission, like the earlier discussed President’s 
Commission on Military Compensation, also included an annuity for 
members that served between ten and nineteen years of service. (Ref. 10 p. 
35-36) 
The result of the above changes would have greatly reduced both the cost of the 
retirement system and the benefits afforded future military retirees with the noted 
exception of personnel separating from service between the tenth and nineteenth year of 
service.  Retirement benefits would have been reduced by anywhere from fifty to ninety 
percent depending on the rate and years of service of a given member at retirement.  The 
proposal again failed to meet all of the objectives of the military retirement system in that 
it really looked almost solely at cutting costs.  Thus while it made the cost of the military 
retirement system more ‘reasonable’ in accordance with the retirement system’s 
objectives it was done at the expense of maintaining the desired force structure and 
manpower objectives.  Once again the proposals were never acted upon by Congress and 
as such did not impact the military retirement system directly.  The study did however 
again raise questions about the twenty-year vesting of the current system and bring more 
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attention to the perceived overly generous nature of the existing military retirement 
system. 
 
D. FIFTH QUADRENNIAL REVIEW OF MILITARY COMPENSATION 
Every four years the Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense is 
required to present to Congress a review of the principles and purposes of the military 
compensation system. (Ref. 8 p. I-1)  The Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation (QRMC) was performed in 1983.  The QRMC typically concentrates its 
efforts on specific areas.  In 1983 the QRMC performed an exhaustive study of the 
military retirement system.  In doing so the recommendations of both the President’s 
Commission on Military Compensation and the Grace Commission’s recommendations 
with regard to the military retirement system were addressed.  The tasking of the Fifth 
QRMC was as follows: 
The specific tasking for the 1983 Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation (QRMC) was to review the Uniformed Services retirement 
system, with its associated benefits, and the Special and Incentive pay 
system.  This review was structured around the following question:  To 
what extent do the existing systems contribute to our national defense?  
The tasking stated, “To the extent that they contribute, they should be 
preserved and strengthened.  To the extent that they do not, they should be 
restructured or else be eliminated.” (Ref 8, p I-1) 
The Fifth QRMC study resulted in over thirty major findings about the military 
retirement system and nineteen recommendations for consideration.  The QRMC also 
developed four primary alternatives for restructuring the existing military retirement 
system.  The alternative plans each consisted of reducing the base multiplier or COLA 
coupled with early withdrawal facets.  The plans were based, as one would expect from 
the tasking, on strengthening the manpower control aspects of the existing retirement 
system.  Thus while the study and subsequent recommendations were informative, they 
failed at the objective of reducing retirement system costs to a more reasonable level.  
The plans basically reallocated the costs in such a manner as to strengthen the manpower 
control facets of the system without looking for potential cost savings.  The study was 
critical of both the President’s Commission on Military Compensation and the Grace 
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Commission findings as being driven by the goal of achieving cost reductions without 
regard for the potential effects the cuts would have on national security.  The QRMC also 
found there to be no merit in the concept of a shorter or longer vesting period than 
currently existed.  The study asserted that shorter-term vesting served only the interest of 
those individuals who separated from the service prior to the twenty-year point.  Thus 
weakening the manpower control aspects of the system while increasing its cost.  
Interestingly the study also found that lengthening the vesting period to more than twenty 
years would lessen the effectiveness of the system as a manpower control tool.  As with 
the earlier studies the recommendations were acknowledged but not directly 
implemented.  Thus the three studies reviewed so far have offered plans to either reduce 
the system costs or increase the manpower and force structure aspects of the retirement 
system, but all have failed at properly balancing the needs of all of the system objectives. 
The Defense Authorization Act of 1986, which implemented the REDUX plan 
discussed in Chapter III, seems to have been a result of a combination of the three studies 
discussed.  The REDUX plan resulted in reduce government cost by reducing the benefits 
afforded the military retiree, both in original entitlements and future COLAs.  The 
REDUX plan also provided added incentive to members to continue to serve after 
reaching the twenty-year point by increasing the additional retirement benefits earned for 
each additional year served.  As is evidenced by the effective repeal of these changes by 
the Defense Authorization Act of 2000, insufficient study was done prior to adopting 
these changes to the military retirement system.    
 
E. RAND RECOMMENDATION FOR MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
1. Introduction 
RAND’s National Defense Research Institute is a federally funded research and 
development center sponsored in part by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  In 1994, 
the institute undertook a study of the military retirement system and possible alternative 
systems.  Reforming The Military Retirement System, published by RAND in 1998 is an 
analysis and extension of the findings of the earlier studies.  The study looked at both the 
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cost and manpower control aspects of the retirement system and attempted to model a 
single replacement system as a better alternative to meeting the objectives of the military 
retirement system.  The Military Federal Employee Retirement System (MFERS) was 
developed at a time when REDUX was the existing military retirement plan.  As a result, 
the manpower control and cost aspects of the MFERS were compared to those the 
military expected to see if REDUX continued unchanged.  As discussed in Chapter III, 
the original REDUX retirement plan has subsequently been supplemented by way of both 
the $30,000 career status bonus and the availability of the TSP.  This chapter presents the 
MFERS plan as developed and includes an analysis of the effects that changes to the 
REDUX system have had on its findings and applicability. 
 
2. MFERS as Presented by RAND in 1997 
The MFERS, based on the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) consists 
of three separate retirement portions coupled with a seven percent across the board base 
pay raise.  The three parts of the MFERS system are: (1) Social Security Benefits, (2) A 
defined benefit plan, and (3) A defined contribution plan. 
 
a. The Social Security Portion 
The Social Security portion of the MFERS recommendation is similar in 
nature to the existing military retirement system.  One difference though is that under the 
MFERS, the Social Security benefits afforded a service member are estimated and 
included in computing the total value of his/her retirement system.  Under the current 
military retirement system the Social Security benefits of the member are considered 
separately from one’s military retirement entitlements.  Another difference is that as 
MFERS was coupled with a one-time seven percent base pay raise, the system would 
result in increased Social Security taxation to the member, and in theory, greater final 
benefit entitlements from the Social Security Administration.  The changes in both the 
costs and benefits afforded the individual are relatively minor.  Thus the only significant 
point here is the inclusion of these benefits in the overall value of the military retirement 
package. 
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b. The Defined Benefit Portion 
The defined benefit portion of the plan is referred to as the ‘Basic Benefit 
Plan.’  The plan would incorporate vesting after a period of five years.  The plan would 
require service members to contribute approximately seven percent of base pay to the 
defined benefit portion of his/her retirement entitlements.  This is a large part of the 
reasoning behind implementation of the system being coupled with an initial one-time 
seven percent across the board pay raise.  The defined benefit is calculated by taking into 
account a members age and number of years of service at the time of retirement.  
Eligibility for retirement would also be a combination of the member’s age and years of 
service.  The youngest age a member would be eligible for retirement benefits under the 
MFERS system is 55, requiring at least 30 years of service.  Conversely a member can 
retire at age 62 with benefits, having served for as few as five years.  An individual’s 
entitlement is found by multiplying his/her years of service times the highest three-year 
average pay times either one or one-point-one percent depending on the retiree’s age and 
years of service.  The one-point-one percent multiplier is applicable only to those with at 
least twenty years of service and 62 years old.   The plan also accounted for COLA as 
follows, if CPI was less than or equal to two percent the COLA was CPI, two percent 
COLA if CPI was between two and three percent and CPI-l if the CPI was greater than 
three percent.  The plan left additional benefits such as medical, commissary, and 
exchange service available to those retiring with greater than twenty years of service.   
 
c. Defined Contribution Portion 
The third and final part of the MFERS is the defined contribution portion.  
The defined contribution portion was modeled after the TSP that was offered Federal 
employees of the time.  The TSP portion of MFERS was very similar to the USTSP 
discussed in Chapter III.  Some basic differences of the TSP portion of MFERS and the 
USTSP were as follows.  The government would automatically match one percent of a 
service member’s base pay.  The military member would be vested in the TSP after only 
three years of service.  The government would also match up to five percent of an 
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individual’s base pay contributions.  Any monies contributed by the member would be 
immediately vested along with earnings on these investments.   
 
3. Summary of MFERS Option 
The original models developed for consideration of the MFERS option were 
designed in 1994.  By 1997, RAND was modifying the basic MFERS recommendation 
by way of adding an additional skewed type base pay raise and/or use of incentive 
bonuses to make the plan more equitable to the objectives of the military retirement 
system.  This was necessary because as originally offered the MFERS resulted in 
significantly reduced benefits to military retirees and at the same time the cost savings of 
the plan were the subject of much discussion as they were heavily dependent upon the 
real discount rate assumed in making the calculations.  The system also had manpower 
control issues such as allowing for early vesting options and the lack of a way to provide 
the necessary incentive for personnel to retire before age 62.  While the system received 
much attention and consideration, it has not yet been fully endorsed by DoD or acted 
upon by Congress. 
 
4. Effects of REDUX Plan Enhancements 
The Defense Authorization Act of 2000 had a significant impact on the findings 
by RAND.  As discussed earlier, the MFERS option was based on the cost, manpower 
control tools, and retiree benefits afforded the military by the REDUX retirement plan.  
Initial Pentagon data reveal that only about seventeen percent of individuals that have had 
the opportunity to elect to take the $30,000 career status bonus and remain under the 
REDUX retirement plan have done so.  (Ref 12 p. 16)  While these are just initial data 
and not yet statistically relevant, they are indicative of the weighting personnel give 
retirement plan considerations.  Regardless of which plan, HI 3 or REDUX with career 
status bonus, a member elects, the cost to the DoD and benefits afforded the retiree are 
substantially different from those used by RAND when developing and analyzing their 
system.  Thus further analysis would be required to reach meaningful conclusions about 
the plans appropriateness today. 
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F. COMPLETE PRIVATIZATION OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
Over the years consideration has been given to privatizing the entire military 
retirement system.  There are currently a multitude of A76 studies looking at the 
government outsourcing of any function that can be better or more cheaply done by the 
private sector.  The military retirement system is one such system that could theoretically 
be outsourced.  Regardless of whether or not the system is outsourced, the structure of the 
retirement system with respect to the benefits and costs would still have to be developed 
and accepted in accordance with the DoD retirement system’s stated objectives.  Cost 
savings may be realizable by fully outsourcing the administration of the military 
retirement system, analysis if these potential savings is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
G. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED CHANGES 
A review of the recommended changes to the military retirement system 
discussed here makes apparent the complexity and enormity of the tasking placed on the 
system.  As was illustrated, it is relatively easy to design a system to lower costs, or 
structure a system to better enable manpower control.  It is significantly more difficult to 
develop a single system that achieves both aspects.  The political aspects of the military 
retirement system serve to make designing the system an even more arduous tasking.  As 
was apparent in the discussion of the MFERS system, even systems designed and tested 
using empirical and theoretical models to prove their merit are not guaranteed to displace 
the existing system.  Yet another testimony to the steadfastness of the military retirement 
system is the Defense Authorization Act of 2000 effectively overriding the cost 
reductions brought about by the 1986 act.  With all this considered, Chapter V will offer 
yet another solution to the question of how to achieve cost savings without losing the 



























V. DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTI-OPTION RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM FOR DOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The premise on which this chapter is based is the development of a retirement 
system for the DoD that maintains, if not enhances, the manpower control aspects of the 
current retirement system but can be implemented at a substantially reduced cost to the 
taxpayer.  As was discussed earlier in the study, the cost of the current system is the main 
reason it has been receiving so much attention in recent years.  It follows from this 
concept then that a system that can accomplish the same or provide enhanced benefits for 
a reduced cost would be in the best interests of both the DoD and service members.  Any 
time the retirement system is debated/changed by Congress there is an immediate and 
apparent effect on service members’ morale and subsequently the services’ accession and 
retention abilities.  Another aspect of the system that must be considered is the 
detrimental effect that the lower benefit level afforded by the adoption of the REDUX 
plan had on manpower control and retention.  Consideration must also be given to 
adopting a plan that is comparable to what is commonly accepted by the majority of 
society.  The existing defined benefit plan, based solely on years of service and highest 
36-months of base pay which vests members only after 20-years of service, is neither 
consistent with nor easily comparable to most civilian employee retirement plans.  The 
movement of most civilian industry to defined contribution type retirement plans that are 
flexible and portable signals the need for the DoD to follow suit if it wants to stay 
competitive for the best possible future military entrants. 
As was discussed above, any retirement system that is to receive serious 
consideration for acceptance by the DoD must have several key elements.  While low 
cost is important to the DoD for many reasons, the ability to maintain force structure and 
required end strength is not negotiable.  The first and probably most important of these 
elements is that the benefits, as perceived by the service member, must be at least equal 
to or greater than those of the old system or there will be immediate detrimental effects 
on force structure and retention efforts as was experienced following the adoption of 
REDUX.  A second element for consideration is the manpower control tools that are 
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required by the objectives of the system.  There is little argument that the existing ’20 or 
nothing’ concept, while outdated, is a large motivator and tool for mid-career service 
member retention.  Consideration must also be given to how to entice members to leave 
the service voluntarily when their staying is no longer in the best interest of the military.  
Another key element of the system is its desirability to potential military entrants.  With 
these key elements taken into consideration the following proposed retirement system is 
offered for consideration.  The cost and benefit values presented in this chapter will be 
based on a deterministic type model.  Chapter VI will then present a stochastic model 
approach to allow for a more accurate comparison of the existing plan and the newly 
proposed option.  All calculations are based on year 2000 DoD data and historical 
inflationary and TSP investment return data. 
 
B. A MULTI-OPTION RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR THE DOD 
To better meet the needs of the DoD while simultaneously lowering system costs 
the proposed system will offer future military entrants three retirement system options 
upon entry into the service.  The three options are, (1) the existing HI 3 plan, (2) the 
REDUX plan coupled with a modified Career Status bonus, and (3) the newly developed 
TSP Only option which will be defined in this chapter. 
 
1. HI 3 Option 
The first option available to future military members would be to opt for the HI 3 
retirement system plan that currently exists.  The plan pays a lifetime annuity 
commencing immediately upon retirement to individuals who serve for at least twenty 
years.  The value of the annuity is based upon a percentage of the average of the 
member’s highest 36 months of base pay.  The plan also accounts for cost of COLA by 
increasing at an annual rate equal to the CPI.  The percentage is found by multiplying a 
service member’s number of years of service by 2.5% with a maximum rate of 75% being 




2. REDUX + Career Status Bonus Option 
The second option offered to new military entrants would be the REDUX plan 
coupled with a $30,000 Career Status Bonus at the fifteenth year of service point.  The 
plan again pays a lifetime annuity commencing immediately upon retirement for 
members having served for at least twenty years. The COLA aspect of the plan is less 
desirable than in the HI 3 scenario in that it increases at a rate of CPI-1% vice the full 
CPI.  There is a one-time catch-up feature at the age of 62 to offset some of the loss in 
cost of living increase benefits, but after age 62 the CPI-1% formula is again applied to 
future COLA.  The annuity payments are based on a percentage of the member’s highest 
36-month period of base pay.  The percentage of base pay factor starts at 40% for twenty 
years of service and then increases by 3.5% for each additional year of service again 
reaching a maximum at 75% for 30+years of service.  The Career Status Bonus is a one-
time $30,000 bonus payment paid to the service member during his/her fifteenth year of 
service.  The amount of the bonus will be increased at the same rate as base pay to 
maintain it as an equitable offset to the differences between the HI 3 plan benefits and the 
REDUX annuity benefits. 
 
3. The TSP Only Option 
The final option available for selection by new military entrants would be the TSP 
Only option.  This option consists of three basic money streams that will increase as base 
pay and years of service increase.  The three sources of money are, a 5% of base pay 
mandatory member contribution, a 5% of base pay government matching contribution, 
and a varying percentage of base pay government incentive contribution.  The money will 
be invested in the member’s TSP account.  The member and government matching 
contributions will vest immediately while the government furnished incentive 
contributions will vest in 5-year blocks based on the member completing the associated 
service period.  The funds will be made available to the member immediately upon 
separation from the service.  If the member has served for less than twenty years the 
funds would be portable or transferable to other retirement type accounts as is common in 
civilian industry.  If the member separates/retires from the service with at least twenty 
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years of service the benefits will be immediately available for withdrawal without 
penalty.  This facet of the TSP Only option requires a change in existing law to allow for 
penalty free withdrawals from the account prior to reaching age fifty-nine and a half.  
This change is necessary to maintain a similar degree of the equity between the benefits 
afforded retiree’s under each option.  Benefits such as commissary, exchange, and 
medical services would remain the same as under the current retirement system. 
 
a. Member Mandatory Contribution 
All members electing the TSP option would be required to make 5% of 
base pay contributions to the account for the duration of their time in service.  As the TSP 
is a retirement investment vehicle, funds that are contributed are tax-deferred.  Thus 
while the required contribution is 5% of base pay, the average military member pays 
federal income tax at a rate of approximately 16%, thus a member’s take home pay would 
be lessened by only 4.2% on average. (Ref. 19 p. 72)  Any funds contributed by the 
member are immediately vested. 
 
b. Government Matching Contribution 
The government would match the 5% of base pay contribution that the 
member makes for the duration of the member’s time in service.  These funds will again 
vest immediately. 
 
c. Government Incentive Contribution 
The government incentive contribution portion of the retirement plan is 
based on the DoD valuation of continued member service.  The rates presented in table 2 
show the percentages used for analysis of the plan and comparison against the other 
options.  The percentages presented in table 2 are based on initial calculations of the 
option providing equal or greater monetary value to the member retiring after twenty 
years of service than the other two options.  They do not take into account the added 
value of the intangibles, such as portability, flexibility, and growth potential, that should 
be considered when making the final implementation decision regarding incentive 
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contribution percentages.  The percentage of base pay that the incentive contributions 
account for will vest only after the member completes the associated period of service.  
For comparison sake the DoD wide vesting period is assumed to be five years.  Thus any 
incentive contributions earned in the five year period automatically vest upon completion 
of that five year period and another five year vesting period with respect to incentive 
contributions begins. 
 
Table 2.   Summary of Retirement Plan Option Benefit Calculations 
 
Option Benefit Calculation/Contribution percent
HI 3 2.5*YOS/100*(Average of highest 36 months of base pay)
REDUX (0.4+(YOS-20)*3.5/100)*(Average of highest 36 months of base pay)
+ $30,000 Career Status Bonus at 15 YOS point
TSP
Member contribution 5%
Government matching contribution 5%
Government Incentive contribution:
YOS
1 to 5 5%
6 to 10 15%
11 to 15 20%
16 to 20 25%
21 to 25 15%
26 and up 10%  
 
C. DETERMISTIC COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
1. Introduction 
The costs and benefits of any retirement system can be found in numerous ways.  
A relatively common and simple approach is the use of a deterministic type analysis.  The 
basic idea behind this type of approach is to utilize existing historical data for model 
input.  The results from a deterministic analysis are point estimates.  In the case of the 
retirement system options, the costs and benefits can be found in this manner to allow for 




To analyze the costs and benefits associated with the various retirement system 
options some assumptions had to be made.  To fully understand the output results from 
any model one must first understand the assumptions and limitations that went into the 
design of the model.  The following list details the major assumptions made when 
calculating the various option costs and benefits. 
• The use of year 2000 data is representative of the average DoD manpower 
force structure, end-strength, base pay, and continuation rate data.  
Detailed data can be reviewed in appendix A.  
• The typical career progression tables remain similar to those found in 
appendix B. 
• The historical rates of return on the TSP funds and inflation rates are 
representative of what future returns will be and can be found in appendix 
C. 
• Necessary policy and statute changes would be enacted concurrently with 
adoption of the new retirement system such that limitations such as 
maximum contribution limits for TSP accounts would not be violated by 
the system. 
• Personnel retiring from military service with at least 20 years of service 
will be of the same proportions as the retirement system option selection 
proportions. 
• Assets invested in the TSP will be allocated pre- and post-retirement in a 
manner similar to the allocations given in Table 3.  This assumption is 
necessary for the user to fully understand how the future values of the TSP 
fund investments presented in this chapter were determined. 
 
Table 3.   Asset Allocation Assumption (After: Ref. 13) 
 
TSP Comparable Pre-retirement Post-retirement 
Fund Index/security percent of assets percent of assets
G-fund Short-term Govt securities 5% 20%
F-fund LehmanBrothers U.S. Aggregate index 10% 40%
C-fund S & P 500 index 40% 25%
S-fund Wilshire 4500 stock index 25% 5%
I-fund EAFE index fund 20% 10%




3. Cost Calculations  
 
a. HI 3 Costs 
The cost of the HI 3 option of the retirement system can be determined by 
using data provided in the Valuation of the Military Retirement System report produced 
by the Department of Defense Office of the Actuary.  The report contains a ‘normal cost’ 
factor for the HI 3 retirement system.  For the year 2000 the normal cost of the HI 3 
system is 29.2% for non-disability retirement payments. (Ref 1, p. 11)  The cost of the HI 
3 portion of the retirement is then found by multiplying the normal cost by the applicable 
percentage of annual gross base pay.  Table 4 contains total cost data for the HI 3 system. 
 
Table 4.   HI 3 Option System Total Costs 
 
Norm al Cost T otal Annual Base pay T otal System  Costs
29.2% X $36,816,041,268 = $10,750,284,050
NO T E:
1.  Assumes 100%  of personnel e lect th is option
2.  Based on year 2000 data  
 
b. REDUX + Career Status Bonus Costs 
There are two separate calculations required to determine the cost of the 
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus option.  The first is similar to that done to find the cost 
of the HI 3 option.  Again the normal cost has been calculated and published by the DoD.  
The normal cost of the REDUX system for year 2000 is 27.2%. (Ref 1, p. 11)  The 
second calculation undertaken to determine the total cost of the option is the cost of the 
bonus.  The cost is found by multiplying the number of personnel who will enter their 
fifteenth year of service by the amount of the bonus and percentage of personnel opting 
for the TSP Only option.  Table 5 contains the total cost data for the REDUX + Career 




Table 5.   REDUX + Career Status Bonus Option Total Costs 
 
Normal Cost Total Annual Base Pay Portion Costs Total Cost
27.20% $36,816,041,268 $10,013,963,225
Bonus Amount Number of Personnel Receiving
$30,000 22639 $679,170,688 $10,693,133,913
Note: Equivalent Normal 
1.  Assumes 100% of personnel elect this option Cost
2.  Based on year 2000 data. 29.04%  
 
c. TSP Only Costs 
Determining the total cost of the TSP Only system requires finding the 
cost of the lost tax revenue, government matching contributions, and government 
incentive contributions.  The cost of the lost tax revenue is found by multiplying 5% of 
the total annual base pay applicable to the option by 16%.  16% is used here as it is 
assumed to be the average federal income tax rate of military personnel today.  The 
government feels the costs of the lost tax revenue.  DoD pays for the government 
matching and incentive contributions costs.  The government matching contribution cost 
is simply 5% of the options applicable gross base pay for the year.  The third and final 
portion of the cost is that of the government incentive contributions.  The cost of the 
incentive contributions is found by using personnel continuation rate data, incentive 
contribution percentages, and base pay data to calculate the total cost.  Table 6 contains 
the total cost data for the TSP Only option. 
 
d. Lowest, Highest, and Nominal System Cost Analysis 
The multi-option aspect of the proposed retirement system allows for total 
retirement system costs to vary greatly depending on the proportion of service members 
selecting each option.  While the author believes that most members would opt for the 
TSP Only option there is no guarantee of this.  One would be remiss to not evaluate the 
lowest, highest, and nominal system costs based on potential options selection 
proportions.  The lowest cost scenario is one in which all members select the TSP Only 
option as it has the lowest normal cost.  The ‘normal cost’ of the TSP Only option is 
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found by dividing the options total cost into the annual gross base pay.  This results in a 
normal cost of only 15.1% for year 2000 data as compared to 29.0% and 29.2% for the 
REDUX + Career Status Bonus and HI 3 options respectively.  The highest cost scenario 
is one in which all personnel that reach at least 20 years of service selected the most 
expensive option, HI 3, while all other personnel opted for the TSP Only option.  A 
nominal case in which 33% of personnel elect each plan and subsequently all members 
serving for at least 20 years being equally dispersed with respect to retirement option 
gives a more realistic total system cost estimate. Table 7 illustrates the cost under each of 
the three scenarios discussed. 
 
Table 6.   TSP Only Option Total Costs 
 
Total TSP Only Option Costs Consist of Three Portions Portion Cost Total  Cost
1.  Lost Tax Revenue Due to Deferral
Average Tax rate % match Base Pay
16% X 5% X $36,816,041,268 $294,528,330
2.  Government Matching Contributions
% Match Base Pay
5% X $36,816,041,268 $1,840,802,063
3.  Government Incentive Contributions
Officer Calculations incorporate base pay $1,353,464,163
and continuation rate data.  The
Enlisted breakdown by years of service $2,064,228,683






1.  Assumes 100% of personnel elect this option





Table 7.   Lowest, Highest, and Nominal Cost Analysis 
 
Lowest Cost Equivalent normal cost
all TSP Only option cost = $5,553,023,240 15.08%
Highest Cost
HI 3 option $10,750,284,050
+
Rest TSP option= $4,351,254,352
Total $15,101,538,402 41.02%
Nominal Cost (33% select each option)
TSP Only $1,849,156,739
+
REDUX + Career Status Bonus $3,560,813,593
+
HI 3 $3,583,069,674
Total Cost $8,993,040,006 24.43%  
 
4. Benefit Calculations 
 
a. HI 3 Benefits 
Retiree entitlements under the HI 3 option are based on the member’s 
years of service at retirement and the average of the highest 36 months of base pay the 
member received.  The percentage of average base pay that the retiree earns is dependent 
upon the number of years served.  The percentage starts at 50% for twenty years of 
service completed and increases by 2.5% for each additional year until reaching a 
maximum of 75% at the 30 years of service point.  The benefits are adjusted for cost of 
living increases by being increased annually at a rate equal to the CPI for the year.  The 
retiree’s annuity is a perpetual type annuity in that payments are received for the 
remainder of the retiree’s lifetime.  Tables 8-11 summarize the option benefits for 
selected retirees to allow for comparison of benefits afforded the retiree under each 
option available. 
 
b. REDUX + Career Status Bonus Benefits 
The benefits afforded a retiree under the REDUX + Career Status Bonus 
option consists of two money streams.  The first money stream is a perpetual annuity 
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similar in calculation to the HI 3 plan annuity.  The value of the two annuities differs in 
the percentage of the average base pay and in the adjustments to account for annual 
increases in cost of living.  The annuity percentage factor starts at 40% for twenty years 
of service, vice the 50% used in the HI 3 calculation, and increases by 3.5% per year to 
again reach a maximum of 75% for thirty years of service.  The annual cost of living 
adjustments are computed by using CPI-1% instead of full CPI.  There is a one-time 
catch up at age 62, after which the annuity again increases at a reduced rate.  The second 
money stream is the value of the career status bonus.  To find the maximum benefit value 
of the option one assumes that the bonus is invested in the TSP and earmarked for use as 
retirement funds.  To determine the value of the bonus at retirement age one needs to 
assume both a rate of return on the investment and rate of inflation for the years between 
receipt of bonus and retirement.  For the purposes of determining a point estimate the rate 
of return used will be a typical asset allocation among the TSP funds for a pre-retirement 
individual.  The asset allocation will be in accordance with the data given in the earlier 
assumptions.  The rate of return will be calculated by finding the weighted average return 
rate for the various funds in the TSP.  The historical average return rate and annual return 
rate data for each of the available TSP funds can be reviewed in Appendix C.  The 
historical average inflation rate and supporting data can be found in Appendix E.  Tables 
8-11 contain selected retiree benefit calculations. 
 
c. TSP Only Benefits 
The TSP Only option retiree benefits differ markedly from the first two 
options in that there is no guaranteed perpetual annuity portion and subsequently no cost 
of living adjustments.  The benefits afforded the retiree are simply the contributions that 
both the retiree and the government made during his/her years of service.  To find the 
retiree’s benefits one must calculate the value of the TSP contributions plus accumulated 
returns for the period that the individual served in the military.  The funds are invested in 
TSP funds in an asset allocation similar to that assumed in defining the model.  To find a 
point estimate of the final value one must again use a weighted average rate of return for 
the given asset allocation.  For the purpose of comparison, actual pay, inflation rates, and 
rates of return on like investments from 1970 to 2000 have been used to compute what a 
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retiree’s benefits would have been had he/she selected the TSP Only option upon entering 
the service.  Tables 8-11 contain selected retiree benefit calculations for the purpose of 
comparing each of the options. 
 
Table 8.   Retirement Entitlements of an O-7 Retiring in Year 2000 After 30 Years of 
Service Under Each Retirement Option 
 
HI 3 option retirement entitlements
Initial
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
75% $7,653 $68,880
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus (CSB) option retirement entitlements
Initial 
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
75% $7,653 $68,880
plus
CSB Value Real Return Rate
$195,542 8.67% $17,217
Total $86,097
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements Initial 
Annual 
TSP Lump Sum Real Return Rate Annuity
$1,024,372 8.67% $92,096
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates





Table 9.   Retirement Entitlements of an E-9 Retiring in Year 2000 After 30 Years of 
Service Under Each Retirement Option 
 
HI 3 option retirement entitlements
Initial
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
75% $3,727 $33,540
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus (CSB) option retirement entitlements
Initial 
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
75% $3,727 $33,540
plus
CSB Value Real Return Rate
$195,542 8.67% $17,217
Total $50,757
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements Initial 
Annual 
TSP Lump Sum Real Return Rate Annuity
$529,035 8.67% $47,563
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates
and asset allocation as outlined in table 3, (3) All cases ignore income tax effects.  
 
D. ALIGNMENT WITH DOD RETIREMENT SYSTEM OBJECTIVES 
 
1. Providing for the Economic Needs of the Retired 
The future economic need of the military retiree is sufficiently met by any 
of the three options offered under the multi-option retirement system proposed.  While 
the make-up and total value of the benefits afforded the retiree vary from option to option 
all three options result in benefits that meet the needs of both the retiree and society as a 
whole.  All three options provide benefits that far exceed the average civilian employee 
retirement system benefit.  The multi-option system also has the benefit of being more  
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Table 10.   Retirement Entitlements of an O-5 Retiring in Year 2000 After 20 Years of 
Service Under Each Retirement Option 
 
HI 3 option retirement entitlements
Initial
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
50% $5,208 $31,246
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus (CSB) option retirement entitlements
Initial 
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
40% $5,208 $24,997
plus
CSB Value Real Return Rate
$71,060 8.67% $6,257
Total $31,254
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements Initial 
Annual 
TSP Lump Sum Real Return Rate Annuity
$451,450 8.67% $39,750
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates
and asset allocation as outlined in table 3, (3) All cases ignore income tax effects.  
 
easily understood and compared to civilian plans thus allowing potential future military 
members to make a more informed decision as to whether the military is right for him/her 
or not.  The fact that all service members selecting the TSP Only option would see their 
retirement benefits amassing in accounts in their own names and the ability to separate 
from service at any point and take some of the retirement benefits with them would 
provide a strong incentive for new entrants to select this option.  An analysis of the 
benefits also reveals that there are in some cases larger annuity payments provided 
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Table 11.   Retirement Entitlements of an E-8 Retiring in Year 2000 After 20 Years of 
Service Under Each Retirement Option 
 
HI 3 option retirement entitlements
Initial
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
50% $2,793 $16,756
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus (CSB) option retirement entitlements
Initial 
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
40% $2,793 $13,405
plus
CSB Value Real Return Rate
$71,060 8.67% $6,257
Total $19,662
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements Initial 
Annual 
TSP Lump Sum Real Return Rate Annuity
$234,046 8.67% $20,608
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates
and asset allocation as outlined in table 3, (3) All cases ignore income tax effects.  
 
by selecting the TSP Only option.  The multi-option retirement system is therefore very 
well aligned with the objective of providing for the future economic needs of military 
retirees. 
 
2. Allowance for Maintaining a Young and Vigorous Force Structure 
The multi-option retirement system would allow for maintaining a young and 
vigorous force structure.  First and foremost is acceptance of the fact that the existing 
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system does an acceptable job of meeting this objective.  The multi-option system leaves 
this intact and gives the DoD the ability to adjust incentive contribution percentages to 
even better control the incentive provided to service members to separate at the 
appropriate time from a DoD perspective.  Thus implementation of the multi-option 
system meets the overall DoD retirement system objective of allowing for maintaining a 
young and vigorous force structure.   
 
3. Maintenance of a Pool of Readily Available Personnel 
By requiring all personnel that serve their country for at least 20 years of service 
to be available for recall, as is the case now, the objective of maintaining a pool of readily 
available personnel is met.  Changing the retirement system structure from its existing 
make-up to the multi-option structure recommended does not reduce the systems ability 
to meet this objective.  All personnel serving for twenty or more years and enjoying the 
added benefits afforded them as a result would still be in the pool of readily available 
personnel. 
 
4. Reasonable Cost to Society 
As was discussed earlier, there is no hard number of what cost is reasonable for 
the DoD military retirement system.  The lower the cost the better seems to be the 
accepted standard.  The multi-option system, as proposed, has great potential to better 
meet this objective by resulting in lower over-all system costs.  The cost of the system is 
dependent on the participation rates in each of the options.  As was shown in Table 7, 
even under the nominal option participation scenario of one-third of service members 
opting for each plan, the normal cost of the system is reduced from its current rate of 
nearly 29% to only 24%.  This 5% reduction in normal cost would have resulted in 
savings of approximately two billion dollars in year 2000 retirement system costs.  The 
author believes the participation in the TSP Only option would far exceed the nominal 





The proposed multi-option retirement system for DoD has many positive traits.  
The improvements over the existing program range from greater manpower control and 
lower cost from the prospective of the DoD to enhanced flexibility, portability, and 
comparability on the part of the military member.  The plan, even with the overly 
generous incentive contribution percentages, reduces the estimated military retirement 
system costs by at least 50%.  The flexibility, portability, and comparability aspects of 
the system coupled with the fact that the TSP Only option does away with the twenty or 
nothing facet of the current system make the multi-option system proposed much more 
appealing to today’s potential military entrants.  This should aid the military services in 
attaining accession goals.  These traits make the system a better overall retirement system 
option for consideration by the DoD.  As was discussed, the plan more completely fulfills 
the requirements of the DoD retirement system objectives.  The retiree benefits presented 
in this chapter are point estimates based on historical data.  Chapter VI develops a 
stochastic approach to calculating the benefits of the REDUX + Career Status Bonus and 
TSP Only options.  This will allow the potential future military member to more 
accurately predict the future economic value of a given retirement system option and thus 
make his/her decision based on more accurate data.  The model will also allow the DoD 
to more accurately evaluate the differences in benefits afforded the military retiree for use 
when deciding on factors such as future incentive contribution percentages.  Lastly the 
model allows the user to change selected inputs and analyze the results the change has on 
retirement system costs and benefits.  This facet allows the DoD the ability to predict 
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VI. SIMULATION MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The use of Monte Carlo type simulation models to more accurately estimate the 
costs and benefits of potential ventures is widely used in business today.  “The Monte 
Carlo method is fast becoming one of the most popular tools in the financial-planning 
field,” according to a recent Wall Street Journal article. (Ref 18)  The output of the model 
is a range of possible outcomes.  The probability of a given outcome is also given.  Thus 
the model provides not only what the best and worst case scenarios are but also the 
probability of either one occurring.  Armed with these data vice a simple point estimate 
the model user can make a better-informed decision and thus increase the chance of 
reaching his/her desired goal.  This type of simulation model lends itself to use in 
estimating the future returns and subsequently the total value of a money stream.  For this 
reason, it is applicable to the analysis of the military retiree benefits afforded an 
individual under either the REDUX + Career Status Bonus option or the TSP Only 
option.  This chapter develops a model that allows the user to vary selected inputs and 
run simulations with the model to derive given estimated cost and benefit data for 
potential military retirement systems and the probability of their occurrence.  Data will be 
presented for the year 2025 and 2035 projected retirement system costs and member 
benefits.  After presenting the 2025 and 2035 data based on the given assumptions, a 
‘what if’ type analysis of the TSP Only option costs and benefits will be presented 
assuming that incentive contribution percentages were decreased by 5% across the board.  
This is done to show the power and utility of the model developed as well as present 
useful data for consideration in determining the most appropriate incentive contribution 
levels. 
 
B. MODEL INFORMATION 
The model was created using the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and Crystal Ball 
simulation software.  The accuracy and usefulness of any model output is limited by the 
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quality of the input data and underlying assumptions of the model.  For this reason the 
next sections of this chapter will define the inputs associated with the model and 
assumptions made inherent to the models construction.  The model developed in this 
Chapter has several objectives.  First and foremost of these objectives is to be a useful 
tool for the DoD when considering the costs and benefits of adapting the proposed 
retirement system.  Secondly, the model is to be of use to the prospective military entrant 
in evaluating which retirement system option affords him/her the most future value.  
Finally, the model will be designed such that it is flexible enough to be relatively easily 
modified for use in considering similar retirement system proposals. 
 
1. Input Data 
The model is based on actual year 2000 DoD military manpower structure, end 
strength and pay data.  This bases the model on a real world set of DoD inputs.  The 
model also requires a basis upon which to estimate future TSP account investment 
returns.  For this purpose, actual return data from related securities for the period from 
1981 to 2001 are used.  While the data presented for analysis in the thesis is restricted to 
that of comparing the options as proposed, the model allows the user to vary several 
inputs.  The potential future military member can change the desired asset allocation, pre- 
and post-retirement, for the purpose of determining the effect it has on future retirement 
option values.  The DoD user can change the end strength, government matching 
contribution percentage, government incentive contribution percentage, the various 
option normal costs, the average federal income tax rate of military personnel, future 
average annual pay raise rate, and finally the percentage of personnel selecting each 
option for analysis purposes. 
 
2. Model Assumptions 
Inherent to understanding the output of the model is an understanding of the 
assumptions that were made when creating the model.  If the user fails to understand all 
the assumptions made he or she may reach invalid or meaningless results from use of the 
model.  The assumptions made in creating the model are as follows: 
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• For the purposes of determining the future costs of the HI 3 and the 
annuity portion of the REDUX + CSB options of the military retirement 
system, the normal cost data for year 2000 are used.  These data are 
relatively stable and only change significantly when the actuaries of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense change the assumptions upon which 
they base their calculations.  The user can change these data if different 
values are deemed more appropriate. 
• The future annual base pay raises are set at 3.5%.  The user can change 
these data if different values are deemed more appropriate. 
• The average federal income tax rate for military personnel is assumed to 
be 16%.  The user can change these data if different values are deemed 
more appropriate. 
• The manpower structure of the military is constant.  The overall end 
strength numbers may be varied as compared to year 2000 data by 
changing the data on the input page.  Evaluating changes in internal 
structure would require significant model revision. 
• The asset allocation chosen by members for funds invested in the TSP 
accounts is in accordance with those presented in Table 3.  The user can 
change these data on the input page if different values are deemed more 
appropriate. 
• The historical return data on securities in indices closely related to the TSP 
funds for the period from 1981 to 2001 are representative of future returns. 
• The typical enlistee enlists at age 18 and the typical officer receives 
his/her commission at age 22. 
• The typical career progression data presented in Appendix D remain valid 
for future years. 
• The government matching and incentive contribution rates are in 
accordance with those presented in Table 2.  The user can change these 
data if different values are deemed more appropriate. 
 
3. What Running the Model Simulations Does 
The Monte Carlo simulation portion of the model is utilized in order to achieve 
more accurate results of the future value of monies invested in the military member’s 
TSP account.  Thus the simulation portion only affects the future values of the TSP Only 
option and the Career Status Bonus portion of the REDUX option.  The simulation uses 
the historical return data presented in Appendix E and the historical inflation rate data 
presented in Appendix G.  The model then uses the relative probability of a given rate 
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coupled with a random number generator to reach overall rate of return results. The rates 
are more likely to reflect the true nature of the market than using a straight average, as 
would be done if using a deterministic approach.  The output of this type of analysis is a 
range of values for the associated money stream and the overall probability of a given 
value being reached.  This allows the user to determine what degree of certainty he/she 
requires of the TSP Only or REDUX + CSB options future value to forego the guaranteed 
annuity benefits of the HI 3 option.  Figure 2 contains a sample forecast cell output from 
the model.  The forecast cell output window shows the entire range of the potential output 
and the associated probability.  The window is interactive when created by the Crystal 
Ball software such that the user can drag the arrows located below the chart to find 
desired dollar value or probability cut-off points.  For example, Figure 2 shows that the 
probability of the future value of the money stream under analysis being greater than $0 
is 34.68%.  The detailed reports containing this type of data for the scenarios evaluated 
are presented in appendices I and J. 
 





C. COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR YEAR 2025 AND 2035 DOD 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OPTIONS 
The estimated costs and benefits of the DoD retirement system for years 2025 and 
2035 are presented in this chapter.  These years are analyzed because they realistically 
represent the earliest possible timeframe for military members to become eligible for 
retirement at both the 20 and 30 years of service point under the proposed retirement 
system.  This assumption is based on the premise that the proposed system is acted on by 
both the DoD and Congress and subsequently implemented in the year 2005. 
 
1. Projected Costs of Each Option 
The cost of each option to the DoD is calculated in the same manner as in Chapter 
5.  The only difference is that the base pay data must be inflated to account for pay raises 
which will have occurred by the year 2025 or 2035 as is appropriate for the case under 
consideration.  The estimated costs of the DoD retirement system options in year 2025 
and 2035 are presented in table 12.  The table shows the total cost for each option 
assuming one-third of military entrants had selected each option.  The cost data are 
presented in this manner to show the individual option’s normal cost, the weighted over-
all normal cost, and to allow for ease of comparison between options.  When calculating 
these data the normal cost, manpower end strength, and incentive and matching 
contribution percentages were the same as were assumed in the calculations in Chapter V.  
The table reveals that even if only 1/3rd of future military members opt for the TSP only 
option it would equate to approximately a 5% reduction in the overall cost of the military 
retirement system.  This equates to about $4.4 and $6.1 Billion in savings in 2025 and 
2035 respectively.  If one assumes a participation rate closer to 100%, as the author 
thinks would be the case, the savings grow to approximately $13.0 and $18.4 Billion for 
the years 2025 and 2035. 
 
2. Projected Benefits of Each Option 
The benefits afforded the military retiree under each of the three options are calculated 
using the same methodology as in Chapter 5.  The difference is that the rates of return on 
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the TSP funds, pre- and post-retirement, and the rates of inflation for future years are 
based on Monte Carlo simulation results rather than actual data or historical averages.  
This results in a more accurate estimation of the future value of the individual’s 
retirement entitlements and gives the probability of the desired outcome or benefit level 
being reached.  This allows for the individual to make a better informed decision as to 
which option is best for him/her and the DoD being able to make a better informed 
decision when establishing future incentive payment percentages and vesting period 
lengths.  The value of the benefits of the REDUX + CSB and TSP Only options will be 
compared to the benefits guaranteed retiring service members under the HI 3 annuity.  In 
the case of the REDUX + CSB analysis, the simulation results reveal the probability that 
the value of the bonus is sufficient to account for the lesser value of the REDUX annuity 
as compared to the HI 3 annuity.  For the TSP Only option the simulation results give the 
user the probability of attaining future monies equal to the HI 3 annuity.  In both cases, 
the results also give the member an idea of what the probability of exceeding the HI 3 
annuity value is and the potential magnitude of these additional benefits. 
The value that is not shown in these calculations is that of choice.  The TSP Only 
and REDUX + CSB options both give the military member additional personal choices 
that are not afforded members under the HI 3 option.  This is especially true of the TSP 
Only option.  The TSP Only option has the added value of removing the 20 or nothing 
facet of the military retirement system, which may be of great value to many prospective 
future military members.  The TSP Only option also has the benefit of allowing the 
former military member the option of when to withdraw the retirement assets.  Currently 
a retiree is paid an annuity commencing immediately upon retirement regardless of 
whether he/she actually fully retires or not.  The TSP Only option would allow members 
to go on to a second career if desired and still have all of their TSP monies remain 
invested for use in later years.  This could dramatically lower the tax burden placed on 
the retirement funds when they are eventually withdrawn as well as allowing for 
significant accumulation of additional assets. 
How one interprets the results of the model output is subject to a person’s 
acceptance of, or aversion to, risk.  As was stated earlier, the model output is a range of 
potential results and the given probability of achieving any given level in the range.   
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Gross Base Normal Percent Manpower Option Normal 
Pay X Cost X Opting Plan X Assumption = Cost Cost
2025 $87,005,324,867 0.292 33.33% 100% $8,467,671,435 29.20%
2035 $122,729,603,425 0.292 33.33% 100% $11,944,486,832 29.20%
REDUX + Career Status Bonus
--Annuity portion
2025 $87,005,324,867 0.272 33.33% 100% $7,887,693,940
2035 $122,729,603,425 0.272 33.33% 100% $11,126,371,295
--Bonus portion
Bonus Amount Number of personnel receiving bonus
2025 $70,897 X 14505 $1,028,381,369




5% Government Matching Contributions portion
Gross Base Percent Percent
Pay X Match X Opting Plan
2025 $87,005,324,867 5% 33.34% $1,450,378,766
2035 $122,729,603,425 5% 33.34% $2,045,902,489
Deferred Tax Revenue portion Average 
X Tax Rate
2025 $87,005,324,867 5% 33.34% 16% $232,060,602
2035 $122,729,603,425 5% 33.34% 16% $327,344,398
Government Incentive Contribution portion
Manpower Incentive Percent
Factor X Pay X Opting Plan
--Officer
2025 100% $3,198,567,396 33% $1,066,402,370
2035 100% $4,511,895,204 33% $1,504,265,861
--Enlisted
2025 100% $4,878,278,082 33% $1,626,417,912
2035 100% $6,881,293,016 33% $2,294,223,092
2025 $4,375,259,650 15.08%
2035 $6,171,735,840 15.08%
Equivalent entire retirement system cost and normal cost for 2025 $21,759,006,394 25.01%
Equivalent entire retirement system cost and normal cost for 2035 $30,693,227,451 25.01%  
 
Many financial advisors recommend that a probability of less than 70% should be 
unacceptable when planning for one’s retirement goals.  This study compares the 
REDUX + CSB and TSP Only options to the HI 3 option.  The actual probability of 
achieving equal or greater results than those afforded the member by the HI 3 option will 
be presented.  When there is an added probability of significant additional assets being 
accumulated these data are also presented. 
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a. Year 2025 Benefit Projections 
The results of running the model to analyze the benefits afforded military 
personnel retiring in the year 2025 with twenty years of service are significantly different 
than those presented in Chapter V.  The model reveals that neither the military officer nor 
military enlistee should realistically expect the retirement entitlements of the REDUX + 
CSB option to equal those of the HI 3 option.  As Table 13 shows, the probability of the 
bonus and associated accumulation value being sufficient to make-up for the reduced 
annuity payments afforded the retiree under the REDUX option is 0.0% and 12.65% for 
the officer and enlisted member respectively.  Obviously this is far below the commonly 
accepted 70% threshold cut-off value.  Thus a member would be unwise to select this 
option.  The analysis also reveals that the TSP Only option benefits have a relatively 
good chance of equaling or exceeding the benefits of the HI 3 option, with both the 
enlisted and officer probabilities being greater than 70%.  The excess funds accumulated 
at the 70% threshold value are also worthy of note.  This is another facet of what makes 
the TSP Only option appealing to future military members.  The lump sum accumulated 
at retirement under the TSP Only option with a probability of 70% is also presented for 
consideration. 
 
b. Year 2035 Benefit Projections 
The results for the typical officer or enlistee retiring in the year 2035 
having served for thirty years reveals that the REDUX + CSB option, while more 
attractive than for a member serving only twenty years, still fails to reach the 70% cut-off 
level that is typically applied by financial advisors.  The enlisted member serving for 30 
years has the best chance of his/her entitlements under the REDUX + CSB equaling or 
exceeding the HI 3 option benefits.  The 61.45% probability may be close enough for an 
individual that is willing to take a risk to consider the option as a result of the significant 





Table 13.   Model Output Results for the Typical Officer and Enlistee Retiring in Year 2025 
Having Twenty Years of Service 
 
HI 3 option retirement entitlements
Initial
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
O-5 50% $12,462 $74,769
E-8 50% $6,698 $40,188
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus (CSB) option retirement entitlements
Initial 
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
Annuity
O-5 40% $12,462 $59,815
E-8 40% $6,698 $32,150
plus
Bonus
Probability of bonus making up for difference
in annuity value between HI 3 and REDUX
O-5 0.00%
E-8 12.65%
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements
Probability of meeting or Excess Lump Sum @
 exceeding the benefits afforded Funds @ 70% 70% Probability
by the HI 3 option probability @ Retirement
O-5 74.15% $3,866,000 $897,000
E-8 71.95% $460,000 $472,566
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates
and asset allocation as outlined in table 3, (3) All cases ignore income tax effects.  
 
going to the 50% probability level the potential excess funds accumulated amount to 
approximately $1.7 million.  The HI 3 option benefits have almost no chance of 
exceeding the benefits of the TSP Only option for either the officer or enlistee in this 
scenario.  The probabilities of the officer and enlisted members benefits under the TSP 
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Only option exceeding those of the HI 3 option are so high, 80 and 86% respectively, that 
the member would accumulate an extra $18+ million at the generally accepted 70% 
probability level.  Table 14 presents the numerical data for further review and analysis. 
 
Table 14.   Model Output Results for the Typical Officer and Enlistee Retiring in Year 2035 
Having Thirty Years of Service 
 
HI 3 option retirement entitlements
Initial
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
O-7 75% $25,729 $231,558
E-9 75% $12,563 $113,068
REDUX  + Career Status Bonus (CSB) option retirement entitlements
Initial 
Years of Service average of 36 Annual 
Factor highest months base pay Annuity
Annuity
O-7 75% $25,729 $231,558
E-9 75% $12,563 $113,068
plus
Bonus Excess
Probability of bonus making up for difference Funds @ 70%
in annuity value between HI 3 and REDUX probability
O-7 89.76% $3,204,402
E-9 97.64% $9,182,550
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements
Probability of meeting or Excess Lump Sum @
 exceeding the benefits afforded Funds @ 70% 70% Probability
by the HI 3 option probability @ Retirement
O-7 80.04% $18,440,000 $2,825,000
E-9 86.12% $18,593,277 $1,495,000
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates




D. ‘WHAT IF’ INCENTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS WERE REDUCED BY 5% 
ACROSS THE BOARD ANALYSIS 
The model can easily be used to perform this analysis.  For this case the user 
simply changes the incentive contribution data on the input page of the model.  In this 
instance all incentive contribution percentages presented in table 2 are reduced by 5%.  
Thus for a member in his/her 6th to 10th year of service the percentage is decreased from 
15% to 10%.  Once the input page data have been updated to the desired value for 
consideration the Crystal Ball simulation program must be run to develop the associated 
output cost and benefit data.  Changing the incentive contribution percentages of the TSP 
Only option has no direct impact on either the Hi 3 or REDUX + CSB option costs or 
benefits thus that data need not be repeated here.  Table 15 presents the TSP Only option 
costs for the same four typical retiree cases evaluated under the original assumptions and 
the difference in option normal costs and total system costs.  As can be seen the decrease 
in the TSP Only option normal cost is 2.51% but the overall system cost decreases by 
only 0.84% or about $1 Billion per year. 
 
Table 15.   ‘What if’ Incentive Contributions Were Reduced by 5% Across the Board Cost 
Analysis of the TSP Only Option 
 
5% Government Matching Contributions portion
Gross Base Percent Percent Option Normal Depicts realizable
Pay X Match X Opting Plan Costs Costs Savings in real dollars
2025 $87,005,324,867 5% 33.34% $1,450,378,766 and normal cost as
2035 $122,729,603,425 5% 33.34% $2,045,902,489 compared to data for
original incentive
Deferred Tax Revenue portion Average contribution percentages
X Tax Rate as depicted in table 12
2025 $87,005,324,867 5% 33.34% 16% $232,060,602
2035 $122,729,603,425 5% 33.34% 16% $327,344,398
Government Incentive Contribution portion
Manpower Incentive Pay including Percent
Factor X Continuation Factors X Opting
--Officer Plan
2025 100% $2,316,213,884 33.34% $772,225,709
2035 100% $3,267,248,434 33.34% $1,089,300,628
--Enlisted Associated Normal
2025 100% $3,578,662,712 33.34% $1,193,126,148 Annual Cost
2035 100% $5,048,057,187 33.34% $1,683,022,266 Savings Resuced
in Dollars By
Equivalent TSP Only option Costs and normal cost for 2025 $3,647,791,225 12.58% $136,068,867 2.51%
Equivalent TSP Only option Costs and normal cost for 2035 $5,145,569,781 12.58% $191,938,575 2.51%
Equivalent entire retirement system cost and normal cost for 2025 $21,031,537,969 24.17% $136,068,867 0.84%
Equivalent entire retirement system cost and normal cost for 2035 $29,667,061,393 24.17% $191,938,575 0.84%  
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The benefits afforded the four typical retiree scenarios that were analyzed under 
the initial assumptions will now be compared to the benefits those same individuals 
would receive if the incentive contributions were decreased as in the ‘what if’ scenario.  
The benefits will obviously be reduced, the real concern to the DoD is whether or not the 
reduction in benefits is sufficient to change the potential military entrants selected 
retirement system option or his/her decision of whether or not to join the military.  The 
primary objective of the model, as stated earlier, is to allow the DoD personnel to 
perform this type of analysis.  Table 16 presents the effects that lowering the incentive 
contributions would have on the retiree benefits.  The results make apparent that lowering 
the incentive contribution percentages by 5% across the board could change the 
retirement option selected by personnel considering serving for either twenty or thirty 
years.  None of the four typical retiree cases now attain the 70% cut-off probability.  At 
the same time the table also illustrates that a significant lump sum is still accumulated by 
the time the retirement point is reached in either case.  Thus, if the member were planning 
on a second career after the military he/she would have a nice start to a retirement nest 
egg under the TSP Only option.  This is the point at which the value of the intangibles 
such as the portability, flexibility, and the fact that the member could leave prior to 
twenty years of service and still have accrued retirement assets, comes into play.  A 
report containing detailed results of the model output for the ‘what if’ scenario is 
presented in appendix J. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The utilization of the Crystal Ball simulation software coupled with the Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet program resulted in a wealth of information that was not available 
when using a deterministic model only.  Inappropriate results may have been experienced 
if one had based decisions about future retirement system options on the deterministically 
determined point estimates presented in Chapter V.  For example, the REDUX + CSB 
option appeared to be a more valuable option that the HI 3 option in all cases when 
examined in Chapter V.  The simulation model’s more accurate approach to estimating 
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Table 16.   ‘What if’ Incentive Contributions Were Reduced by 5% Across the Board Benefit 
Analysis of the TSP Only Option 
 
TSP ONLY option retirement entitlements
Probability of meeting or Excess Lump Sum @
 exceeding the benefits afforded Funds @ 70% 70% Probability
YOS by the HI 3 option probability @ Retirement
O-7 30 51.72% $0 $2,273,619
E-9 30 61.92% $0 $1,073,469
O-5 20 37.16% $0 $719,211
E-8 20 34.68% $0 $379,582
Note: (1) All options account for 3% annual increase in annuity payments to account for COLA,
(2) Real return rate for TSP and CSB calculations is based on historical TSP fund return rates
and asset allocation as outlined in table 3, (3) All cases ignore income tax effects.  
 
future returns reveals that the HI 3 option is in fact far superior to the REDUX + CSB 
option in the case of the typical twenty year retiree.  The probability data presented for 
the future value of TSP Only option make it appear to be significantly more superior to 
the HI 3 option than it did as presented in Chapter V especially in the case of service 
members planning to serve their country for thirty years.  The prospective military entrant 
could then use the probability data when making the choice of whether or not the military 
was right for them and which retirement option was in their best interest.  The DoD could 
use the data to more accurately find the optimal incentive contribution percentages that 
would provide comparable retirement benefits to future service members and thus 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The study was undertaken to analyze the existing military retirement system and 
its objectives with an end goal of finding ways to improve the system’s alignment with its 
objectives while simultaneously reducing its cost.  The study presented a thorough review 
of the objectives of the military retirement system as well as an analysis of the alignment 
of the current military retirement system with its objectives.  A review of recently 
proposed alternatives to, and modifications for, the retirement system was then presented.  
Based on the knowledge gained from reviewing the system’s objectives and the 
justifications and criticisms of the proposed alternative retirement options, an alternative 
proposal was then presented.  The proposed multi-option retirement system enhances the 
manpower control tools afforded the DoD over those provided by the existing system.  
The system accomplishes this while allowing for significant potential cost savings.  As 
was discussed earlier, one of the main reasons that the current system has received so 
much attention as of late is its cost.  The multi-option system also has the added benefit 
of being much more comparable to retirement plans available to civilian employees.  
These facts reveal that the proposed multi-option retirement system is better aligned with 
the stated objectives of the military retirement system. 
 
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS IN REVIEW 
A review of the research questions that the study set out to answer is appropriate 
at this point.  The questions were as follows: 
The primary question that this thesis was to addresses was:  Given the current 
objectives of the DoD retirement system; can the needs of both the DoD and today’s 
potential military entrants be better met by development of a new multi-option type 
retirement system than by the current defined benefit system? 
Secondary questions that have been addressed include the following: 
• What are the objectives of the retirement system and does the current 
system meet them? 
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• How would a multi-option retirement system be structured to meet the 
objectives of the DoD retirement? 
• What, if any, cost savings can be attained by implementing the 
aforementioned multi-option retirement system? 
• What effect would the transition to a new retirement system have on 
personnel accessions as well as retention? 
The discussion of the proposed multi-option retirement system’s degree of 
alignment with the stated objectives of the DoD retirement system coupled with the cost 
and benefit analysis results from the model make clear that a better system can be 
developed.  The research that went into developing the proposed retirement system 
included an in depth discussion of the objectives of the military retirement system.  The 
proposed system also presents one possible answer to the question of how an alternative 
retirement system could be structured to better meet the objectives of the retirement 
system.  By using the model developed one can readily analyze various ‘what if’ 
scenarios/versions of proposed military retirement systems and determine the potential 
cost savings that might be afforded the DoD if the system were adopted.  The answer to 
the question of what effects that transitioning to the proposed retirement system would 
have on future accessions and retention cannot be answered with numerical certainty.  
How people would react to the adoption of the proposed system can only be estimated.  
Based on the facts the proposed system still offers the current retirement options 
available to today’s potential military entrant and that the TSP Only option adds to the 
total compensation package available to potential entrants it follows that personnel 
accessions should be enhanced.  As to the question of future retention, proper use of the 
incentive contributions should have the effect of increasing the services ability to retain 
the proper number of personnel to meet future manning level requirements. 
 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The study makes clear that an alternative retirement system for the military can be 
developed that meets both the enhanced manpower control needs of the DoD and the 
cost-savings desired by society as a whole.  While there are still areas that would require 
further analysis to find the ideally structured system, the study presented a viable option 
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that is better aligned with the system objectives than the current system.  The proposed 
multi-option system has the benefit of enhancing the service’s manpower control tools by 
allowing for adjustments to the incentive contribution percentages as well as the vesting 
period lengths.  At the same time, the system has the potential to save the taxpayers up to 
half of the money spent on the current system. 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A multi-option retirement system similar to that proposed by this system should 
be given serious consideration for adoption by both Congress and the DoD.  The cost-
savings afforded the military from such action might lessen the possibility of future 
benefit reductions in the name of cost savings.  The system would also make it easier for 
the military to compare its retirement benefits package, and use the generosity of those 
benefits, to that of civilian employers for the purpose of recruiting and retaining 
personnel future military personnel. 
 
E. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
• A study of the ideal vesting period for incentive contributions could be 
undertaken based on individual service make-up and manpower goals. 
• A study could be undertaken to determine, with a degree of statistical 
significance, what percent of military personnel and potential military 
personnel would select each option of a system similar to the proposed 
multi-option retirement system. 
• A study could be undertaken to attempt to determine a dollar value of the 
added flexibility, portability, and freedom of choice afforded individuals 
by an option like the TSP Only option presented in this study. 
• A study of the impact of the additional unfunded liability of the Military 
Retirement Fund as a result of the difference between the actual versus 
predicted member participation rates in the REDUX with bonus option 
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APPENDIX A YEAR 2000 MEMBER CONTINUATION DATA 
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APPENDIX B YEAR 2000 OFFICER END-STRENGTH, GROSS 
BASE PAY, AND INCENTIVE PAY BY YEAR OF SERVICE 
 
YEARS OF ANNUAL OFFICER INCENTIVE
SERVICE BASE PAY ENDSTRENGTH PAY
0 $319,831,284 11406 $10,658,958
1 $353,259,576 12758 $11,925,665
2 $409,370,652 12188 $14,063,208
3 $461,674,608 12210 $16,738,806
4 $449,043,396 10846 $19,158,436
5 $434,853,036 10355 $21,742,652
6 $433,499,328 9880 $40,219,016
7 $414,358,416 9334 $43,389,581
8 $444,276,336 9661 $51,662,897
9 $426,035,940 9105 $55,846,921
10 $422,610,828 8715 $63,391,624
11 $478,360,140 9535 $93,910,055
12 $478,427,160 9204 $102,603,465
13 $472,560,060 9016 $107,254,956
14 $497,208,840 9258 $119,404,703
15 $499,169,448 9160 $124,792,362
16 $528,783,000 9369 $76,708,589
17 $531,152,064 9076 $78,576,647
18 $520,247,712 8503 $78,214,937
19 $514,981,632 8264 $78,308,107
20 $384,598,800 5949 $57,689,820
21 $336,191,580 5044 $19,992,441
22 $282,929,076 4086 $21,203,602
23 $257,405,112 3625 $24,310,970
24 $219,191,448 3009 $26,089,262
25 $183,883,512 2460 $27,582,527
26 $160,075,596 2066 $6,346,187
27 $134,945,700 1703 $6,742,172
28 $110,808,456 1380 $6,976,969
29 $92,663,460 1130 $7,352,846
30+ $131,508,564 1515 $13,150,856
Totals $11,383,904,760 229810 $1,353,464,163
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APPENDIX C YEAR 2000 ENLISTED END-STRENGTH, GROSS 
BASE PAY, AND INCENTIVE PAY BY YEAR OF SERVICE 
 
YEARS OF ANNUAL ENLISTED INCENTIVE
SERVICE BASE PAY ENDSTRENGTH PAY
0 $2,383,019,136 174153 $38,137,172
1 $2,129,160,684 144768 $39,031,492
2 $2,131,784,700 128667 $43,339,908
3 $2,070,841,128 113678 $50,293,757
4 $1,350,013,116 68682 $54,709,282
5 $995,335,944 49661 $49,766,797
6 $920,548,080 43323 $70,663,112
7 $906,766,740 41738 $82,382,802
8 $859,012,680 37670 $93,410,156
9 $742,020,420 31819 $93,605,876
10 $749,562,528 30624 $112,434,379
11 $773,731,344 31151 $153,365,167
12 $744,753,432 28555 $160,196,755
13 $837,727,128 31722 $192,106,006
14 $939,593,532 34262 $225,807,816
15 $974,305,716 34511 $243,576,429
16 $1,035,040,584 35281 $99,722,658
17 $1,014,228,912 33432 $99,316,520
18 $1,020,902,928 32917 $100,959,463
19 $1,056,136,992 33480 $105,317,981
20 $530,319,768 15553 $106,063,954
21 $365,423,544 10204 $12,110,749
22 $275,402,664 7162 $13,312,874
23 $205,636,608 5170 $14,498,842
24 $130,299,816 3035 $13,400,033
25 $96,219,072 2176 $14,432,861
26 $63,280,716 1330 $1,398,153
27 $52,442,736 1088 $1,690,043
28 $40,387,380 830 $1,898,398
29 $32,855,820 675 $2,252,595
30+ $5,382,660 113 $538,266
Totals $25,432,136,508 1207430 $2,064,228,683
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
77 
APPENDIX D TYPICAL DOD CAREER PROGRESSION 
 

































Souce data adapted from 
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APPENDIX E HISTORICAL TSP RETURN DATA 
 
TSP fund  G-fund F-fund C- fund S- fund I- fund Inflation 
Related index Related Sec. LBA S&P 500 Wilshire 4500 EAFE Rate Data
1981 14.18 6.26 -5.09 -1.65 -2.28 10.36
1982 13.56 32.64 21.08 13.73 -1.86 6.16
1983 11.61 8.37 22.39 24.75 23.69 3.21
1984 13.12 15.15 6.11 -1.72 7.38 4.37
1985 11.33 22.13 32.04 32.02 56.16 3.54
1986 8.29 15.25 18.55 11.76 67.42 1.86
1987 8.73 2.76 5.23 -3.51 27.40 3.66
1988 9.19 7.89 16.61 20.54 28.25 4.12
1989 9.01 14.53 31.69 23.94 10.36 4.81
1990 8.97 8.96 -3.10 -13.56 -23.59 5.39
1991 8.26 16.00 30.47 43.45 12.19 4.22
1992 7.32 7.40 7.62 11.87 -12.22 3.01
1993 6.23 9.75 10.08 14.57 32.68 2.98
1994 7.29 -2.92 1.32 -2.66 7.75 2.6
1995 7.10 18.47 37.58 33.48 11.27 2.76
1996 6.80 3.63 22.96 17.18 6.14 2.96
1997 6.80 9.65 33.36 25.69 1.55 2.35
1998 5.77 8.69 28.58 8.63 20.09 1.51
1999 6.03 -0.82 21.04 35.49 26.72 2.21
2000 6.42 11.63 -9.10 -15.77 -14.17 3.38
2001 5.39 8.61 -11.94 -9.04 -21.94 2.86
Average
rate of return 8.64% 10.67% 15.12% 12.82% 12.52% 3.73%
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APPENDIX F YEAR 2000 AVERAGE BASE PAY TABLE 
 
Years of Service
Rate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
O-10 8215 8504 8504 8504 8504 8504 8504 8830 8830 8830 8830 9320 9320 9320 9320
O-9 7281 7472 7631 7631 7631 7631 7631 7825 7825 7825 7825 8150 8150 8150 8150
O-8 6594 6801 6953 6973 6973 7062 7062 7472 7472 7506 7506 7825 7825 7865 7865
O-7 5480 5852 5852 5873 5873 6115 6115 6198 6198 6472 6472 6569 6569 6828 6828
O-6 4061 4462 4754 4754 4754 4763 4763 4866 4866 4879 4879 4879 4879 5043 5043
O-5 3248 3814 4078 4103 4103 4185 4185 4185 4185 4311 4311 4543 4543 4848 4848
O-4 2738 3334 3556 3581 3581 3717 3717 3881 3881 4146 4146 4366 4366 4536 4536
O-3 2544 2844 3077 3365 3365 3526 3526 3677 3677 3850 3850 4040 4040 4139 4139
O-2 2219 2475 2911 3009 3009 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071
O-1 1926 2005 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423
O-3E 0 0 0 3365 3365 3526 3526 3677 3677 3850 3850 4040 4040 4200 4200
O-2E 0 0 0 3009 3009 3071 3071 3169 3169 3334 3334 3461 3461 3556 3556
O-1E 0 0 0 2423 2423 2588 2588 2684 2684 2781 2781 2878 2878 3009 3009
W-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
W-4 2592 2785 2825 2896 2896 3029 3029 3161 3161 3294 3294 3473 3473 3622 3622
W-3 2356 2555 2555 2588 2588 2657 2657 2813 2813 2974 2974 3071 3071 3173 3173
W-2 2063 2233 2233 2302 2302 2423 2423 2555 2555 2653 2653 2750 2750 2844 2844
W-1 1719 1971 1971 2136 2136 2233 2233 2330 2330 2428 2428 2528 2528 2626 2626
E-9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3015 3015 3083 3083 3161 3161
E-8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2528 2528 2602 2602 2670 2670 2745 2745
E-7 1766 1917 1989 2059 2059 2132 2132 2202 2202 2273 2273 2345 2345 2434 2434
E-6 1519 1667 1740 1811 1811 1882 1882 1953 1953 2025 2025 2113 2113 2182 2182
E-5 1333 1472 1544 1614 1614 1703 1703 1775 1775 1846 1846 1917 1917 1934 1934
E-4 1243 1343 1419 1509 1509 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575
E-3 1172 1248 1309 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336
E-2 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
E-1 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006
Years of Service
Rate 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
O-10 9986 9986 9986 9986 10681 10681 10681 10681 10681 10681 11318 11318 11318 11318 11318
O-9 8830 8830 8830 8830 9320 9320 9320 9320 9320 9320 9986 9986 9986 9986 9986
O-8 8150 8150 8504 8504 8830 8830 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048 9048
O-7 7472 7472 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985 7985
O-6 5742 5742 6035 6035 6248 6248 6509 6509 6703 6703 7032 7032 7032 7032 7032
O-5 5182 5182 5402 5402 5557 5557 5738 5738 5738 5738 5738 5738 5738 5738 5738
O-4 4709 4709 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797 4797
O-3 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139 4139
O-2 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071 3071
O-1 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423 2423
O-3E 4246 4246 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309
O-2E 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556 3556
O-1E 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009 3009
W-5 0 0 0 0 4449 4449 4610 4610 4754 4754 4930 4930 4930 4930 4930
W-4 3752 3752 3869 3869 3997 3997 4131 4131 4262 4262 4427 4427 4427 4427 4427
W-3 3281 3281 3392 3392 3518 3518 3641 3641 3701 3701 3825 3825 3825 3825 3825
W-2 2947 2947 3049 3049 3150 3150 3267 3267 3321 3321 3321 3321 3321 3321 3321
W-1 2726 2726 2823 2823 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911 2911
E-9 3249 3249 3336 3336 3417 3417 3574 3574 3710 3710 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899
E-8 2826 2826 2904 2904 2986 2986 3140 3140 3277 3277 3475 3475 3475 3475 3475
E-7 2505 2505 2577 2577 2630 2630 2781 2781 2919 2919 3127 3127 3127 3127 3127
E-6 2244 2244 2280 2280 2280 2280 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281
E-5 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934 1934
E-4 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575 1575
E-3 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336
E-2 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127 1127
E-1 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006
Note: Values rounded to nearest dollar, values are average of Jan and Jul paytable entries.
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Source data adapted from
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APPENDIX H1 DETERMINISTICALLY FOUND TSP ONLY 
BENEFITS FOR AN O-7 RETIRING IN YEAR 2000 WITH 30 YEARS 
OF SERVICE 
Calendar Year of Pay Monthly Member Govt Govt Total 
Year Service Rate Base Pay 5% 5% Incentive Accumulated
1970 0 O-1 $418 $21 $21 $21 $752
1971 1 1 $473 $24 $24 $24 $1,675
1972 2 2 $690 $35 $35 $35 $3,077
1973 3 2 $909 $45 $45 $45 $5,006
1974 4 3 $1,108 $55 $55 $55 $7,478
1975 5 3 $1,163 $58 $58 $58 $10,283
1976 6 3 $1,263 $63 $63 $189 $15,052
1977 7 3 $1,341 $67 $67 $201 $20,509
1978 8 3 $1,467 $73 $73 $220 $26,863
1979 9 3 $1,570 $79 $79 $236 $34,132
1980 10 4 $1,753 $88 $88 $263 $42,643
1981 11 4 $2,216 $111 $111 $554 $46,863
1982 12 4 $2,305 $115 $115 $576 $60,890
1983 13 4 $2,305 $115 $115 $576 $81,586
1984 14 4 $2,532 $127 $127 $633 $93,273
1985 15 4 $2,633 $132 $132 $658 $133,519
1986 16 5 $2,838 $142 $142 $568 $175,679
1987 17 5 $3,093 $155 $155 $619 $193,396
1988 18 5 $3,585 $179 $179 $717 $234,456
1989 19 5 $3,732 $187 $187 $746 $289,686
1990 20 5 $3,983 $199 $199 $797 $265,226
1991 21 5 $4,147 $207 $207 $622 $339,415
1992 22 6 $5,054 $253 $253 $758 $360,237
1993 23 6 $5,240 $262 $262 $786 $421,048
1994 24 6 $5,537 $277 $277 $831 $432,966
1995 25 6 $5,681 $284 $284 $852 $558,675
1996 26 6 $6,103 $305 $305 $610 $642,878
1997 27 7 $7,154 $358 $358 $715 $782,396
1998 28 7 $7,355 $368 $368 $736 $935,051
1999 29 7 $7,620 $381 $381 $762 $1,146,352
2000 30 7 $7,985 $399 $399 $799 $1,024,372
Total contributions by source $61,952 $61,952 $183,140
Note:  Rates of return and inflation for 1970-1980 time frame based
on average of past 20 years due to lack of similar investment 
vehicle for comparison in the case of some of the TSP funds.  All
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APPENDIX H2 DETERMINISTICALLY FOUND TSP ONLY 
BENEFITS FOR AN E-9 RETIRING IN YEAR 2000 WITH 30 YEARS 
OF SERVICE 
 
Calendar Year of Pay Monthly Member Govt Govt Total 
Year Service Rate Base Pay 5% 5% Incentive Accumulated
1970 0 E-1 $133 $7 $7 $7 $239
1971 1 2 $224 $11 $11 $11 $665
1972 2 3 $363 $18 $18 $18 $1,382
1973 3 4 $439 $22 $22 $22 $2,304
1974 4 5 $513 $26 $26 $26 $3,447
1975 5 5 $539 $27 $27 $27 $4,745
1976 6 5 $595 $30 $30 $89 $6,983
1977 7 5 $632 $32 $32 $95 $9,544
1978 8 6 $761 $38 $38 $114 $12,736
1979 9 6 $815 $41 $41 $122 $16,394
1980 10 6 $946 $47 $47 $142 $20,794
1981 11 6 $1,099 $55 $55 $275 $22,929
1982 12 7 $1,143 $57 $57 $286 $29,856
1983 13 7 $1,143 $57 $57 $286 $40,057
1984 14 7 $1,378 $69 $69 $345 $46,362
1985 15 7 $1,498 $75 $75 $375 $67,161
1986 16 7 $1,582 $79 $79 $316 $88,924
1987 17 8 $1,635 $82 $82 $327 $98,142
1988 18 8 $1,999 $100 $100 $400 $119,625
1989 19 8 $1,999 $100 $100 $400 $148,147
1990 20 8 $2,122 $106 $106 $424 $135,944
1991 21 9 $2,183 $109 $109 $327 $174,143
1992 22 9 $2,764 $138 $138 $415 $185,338
1993 23 9 $2,866 $143 $143 $430 $217,135
1994 24 9 $3,043 $152 $152 $456 $223,844
1995 25 9 $3,122 $156 $156 $468 $289,391
1996 26 9 $3,377 $169 $169 $338 $333,525
1997 27 9 $3,479 $174 $174 $348 $405,349
1998 28 9 $3,576 $179 $179 $358 $483,874
1999 29 9 $3,705 $185 $185 $371 $592,648
2000 30 9 $3,899 $195 $195 $390 $529,035
Total contributions by source $32,143 $32,143 $96,070
Note:  Rates of return and inflation for 1970-1980 time frame based
on average of past 20 years due to lack of similar investment 
vehicle for comparison in the case of some of the TSP funds.  All
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APPENDIX H3 DETERMINISTICALLY FOUND TSP ONLY 
BENEFITS FOR AN O-5 RETIRING IN YEAR 2000 WITH 20 YEARS 
OF SERVICE 
 
Calendar Year of Pay Monthly Member Govt Govt Total 
Year Service Rate Base Pay 5% 5% Incentive Accumulated
1980 0 O-1 $925 $46 $46 $46 $1,665
1981 1 1 $1,057 $53 $53 $53 $3,369
1982 2 2 $1,382 $69 $69 $69 $6,169
1983 3 2 $1,382 $69 $69 $69 $9,773
1984 4 3 $1,438 $72 $72 $72 $12,487
1985 5 3 $2,076 $104 $104 $104 $20,131
1986 6 3 $2,139 $107 $107 $321 $31,365
1987 7 3 $2,308 $115 $115 $346 $39,464
1988 8 3 $2,439 $122 $122 $366 $52,526
1989 9 3 $2,539 $127 $127 $381 $69,506
1990 10 4 $2,910 $146 $146 $437 $68,927
1991 11 4 $3,029 $151 $151 $757 $97,696
1992 12 4 $3,334 $167 $167 $834 $113,328
1993 13 4 $3,587 $179 $179 $897 $142,578
1994 14 4 $3,694 $185 $185 $924 $156,504
1995 15 4 $3,790 $190 $190 $948 $211,702
1996 16 5 $4,417 $221 $221 $883 $253,960
1997 17 5 $4,810 $241 $241 $962 $319,608
1998 18 5 $4,944 $247 $247 $989 $392,555
1999 19 5 $5,122 $256 $256 $1,024 $492,025
2000 20 5 $5,557 $278 $278 $1,111 $451,450
Total contributions by source $37,728 $37,728 $139,101
Note:  Rates of return and inflation for 1970-1980 time frame based
on average of past 20 years due to lack of similar investment 
vehicle for comparison in the case of some of the TSP funds.  All
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APPENDIX H4 DETERMINISTICALLY FOUND TSP ONLY 
BENEFITS FOR AN E-8 RETIRING IN YEAR 2000 WITH 20 YEARS 
OF SERVICE 
 
Calendar Year of Pay Monthly Member Govt Govt Total 
Year Service Rate Base Pay 5% 5% Incentive Accumulated
1980 0 E-1 $501 $25 $25 $25 $902
1981 1 2 $618 $31 $31 $31 $1,907
1982 2 3 $705 $35 $35 $35 $3,352
1983 3 4 $705 $35 $35 $35 $5,228
1984 4 5 $825 $41 $41 $41 $6,780
1985 5 5 $980 $49 $49 $49 $10,666
1986 6 5 $1,009 $50 $50 $151 $16,245
1987 7 5 $1,108 $55 $55 $166 $20,178
1988 8 6 $1,291 $65 $65 $194 $26,988
1989 9 6 $1,343 $67 $67 $201 $35,828
1990 10 6 $1,443 $72 $72 $216 $35,358
1991 11 6 $1,502 $75 $75 $376 $49,899
1992 12 7 $1,815 $91 $91 $454 $58,354
1993 13 7 $1,882 $94 $94 $471 $73,562
1994 14 7 $2,010 $101 $101 $503 $81,184
1995 15 7 $2,063 $103 $103 $516 $110,225
1996 16 7 $2,172 $109 $109 $434 $131,767
1997 17 8 $2,239 $112 $112 $448 $164,904
1998 18 8 $2,648 $132 $132 $530 $202,891
1999 19 8 $2,744 $137 $137 $549 $254,651
2000 20 8 $2,986 $149 $149 $597 $234,046
Total contributions by source $19,554 $19,554 $72,259
Note:  Rates of return and inflation for 1970-1980 time frame based
on average of past 20 years due to lack of similar investment 
vehicle for comparison in the case of some of the TSP funds.  All
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APPENDIX I DETAILED REPORT OF MODEL OUTPUT FOR 
THE ORIGINAL SET OF ASSUMPTIONS 
Crystal Ball Report
Simulation started on 5/15/02 at 22:29:37
Simulation stopped on 5/15/02 at 22:30:15
Forecast: 30 year O-7 accumulation Cell:  I37
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.10%
Certainty Range is from $2,832,583 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $1,340,661 to $5,816,427 
Entire Range is from $1,225,539 to $8,228,228 














Mean Std. Error $20,076.18
Crystal Ball Student Edition
Not for Commercial Use
Frequency Chart











$1,340,661 $2,459,602 $3,578,544 $4,697,485 $5,816,427



















Forecast: 30 year E-9 Accumulation Cell:  Q37
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.15%
Certainty Range is from $1,498,053 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $708,746 to $3,076,666 
Entire Range is from $643,613 to $4,340,621 














Mean Std. Error $10,601.72  
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Crystal Ball Student Edition
Not for Commercial Use
Frequency Chart











$708,746 $1,300,726 $1,892,706 $2,484,686 $3,076,666




Forecast: 20 year retiree bonus accumulation Cell:  B48
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.05%
Certainty Range is from $84,990 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $51,300 to $137,686 
Entire Range is from $49,576 to $164,068 














Mean Std. Error $373.50
Crystal Ball Student Edition
Not for Commercial Use
Frequency Chart











$51,300 $72,896 $94,493 $116,089 $137,686



















Forecast: 30 year probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  Z77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 74.15%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($88,455,374) to $232,238,471 
Entire Range is from ($101,724,644) to $426,803,854 














Mean Std. Error $1,514,597.05  
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Crystal Ball Student Edition
Not for Commercial Use
Frequency Chart











($88,455,374) ($8,281,913) $71,891,548 $152,065,009 $232,238,471




Forecast: 20 year O-5 Accumulation Cell:  Z27
Summary:
Certainty Level is 69.85%
Certainty Range is from $901,463 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $556,973 to $1,531,943 
Entire Range is from $556,973 to $1,962,849 














Mean Std. Error $4,423.38
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$556,973 $800,716 $1,044,458 $1,288,201 $1,531,943



















Forecast: 20 year E-8 Accumulation Cell:  AH27
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.00%
Certainty Range is from $474,996 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $294,986 to $804,447 
Entire Range is from $294,986 to $1,024,154 














Mean Std. Error $2,308.97  
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$294,986 $422,351 $549,717 $677,082 $804,447




Forecast: 20 year E-8 probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  AH77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 71.95%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($48,908,809) to $118,779,524 
Entire Range is from ($57,715,680) to $217,604,439 














Mean Std. Error $787,122.95
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($48,908,809) ($6,986,726) $34,935,357 $76,857,441 $118,779,524



















Forecast: 30 year O-7 probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  Q77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 99.35%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($4,676,248) to $223,701,251 
Entire Range is from ($12,743,305) to $519,290,354 














Mean Std. Error $1,180,159.21
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($4,676,248) $52,418,127 $109,512,502 $166,606,877 $223,701,251




Forecast: 30 year O-7 probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  I77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 98.45%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($22,074,108) to $408,954,697 
Entire Range is from ($35,919,798) to $961,377,148 














Mean Std. Error $2,201,280.82
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($22,074,108) $85,683,094 $193,440,295 $301,197,496 $408,954,697



















Forecast: 30 year retiree bonus accumulation Cell:  F58
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.05%
Certainty Range is from $194,685 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $99,012 to $436,681 
Entire Range is from $82,688 to $603,629 














Mean Std. Error $1,615.45  
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$99,012 $183,429 $267,847 $352,264 $436,681




Forecast: Probability of bonus equalling delta for 20 year O-5 Cell:  B98
Summary:
Certainty Level is 0.05%
Certainty Range is from ($8,268,353) to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($53,283,536) to ($8,268,353) 
Entire Range is from ($77,484,952) to ($8,103,268) 














Mean Std. Error $205,986.53
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($53,283,536) ($42,029,740) ($30,775,944) ($19,522,149) ($8,268,353)



















Forecast: Probability of bonus equalling delta for 30 year O-7 Cell:  F98
Summary:
Certainty Level is 2.45%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($35,431,083) to $4,587,254 
Entire Range is from ($45,585,010) to $40,939,120 














Mean Std. Error $165,019.17  
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($35,431,083) ($25,426,499) ($15,421,915) ($5,417,330) $4,587,254




Forecast: Probability of bonus equalling delta for 30 year E-9 Cell:  G98
Summary:
Certainty Level is 60.50%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($14,263,546) to $21,486,851 
Entire Range is from ($14,263,546) to $75,765,419 














Mean Std. Error $161,358.11
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($14,263,546) ($5,325,947) $3,611,652 $12,549,251 $21,486,851



















Forecast: Probability of bonus equalling delta for 20 year E-8 Cell:  C98
Summary:
Certainty Level is 13.05%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($20,113,912) to $9,282,546 
Entire Range is from ($24,059,534) to $30,400,890 














Mean Std. Error $121,602.22  
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($20,113,912) ($12,764,798) ($5,415,683) $1,933,431 $9,282,546







 Custom  distribution with parameters: Relative Prob.
Continuous range 1.00 to 2.00 2.00
Continuous range 2.00 to 3.00 7.00
Continuous range 3.00 to 4.00 5.00
Continuous range 4.00 to 5.00 4.00
Continuous range 5.00 to 6.00 1.00
Continuous range 6.00 to 7.00 1.00
Continuous range 10.00 to 11.00 1.00
Total Relative Probability 21.00
Assumption:  G-fund
Cell:  K3
 Custom  distribution with parameters: Relative Prob.
Continuous range 5.00 to 6.00 2.00
Continuous range 6.00 to 7.00 5.00
Continuous range 7.00 to 8.00 3.00
Continuous range 8.00 to 9.00 4.00
Continuous range 9.00 to 10.00 2.00
Continuous range 11.00 to 12.00 2.00
Continuous range 13.00 to 14.00 2.00
Continuous range 14.00 to 15.00 1.00
Total Relative Probability 21.00
Crystal Ball Student Edition














 Custom  distribution with parameters: Relative Prob.
Continuous range -3.00 to -1.00 1.00
Continuous range -1.00 to 1.00 1.00
Continuous range 1.00 to 3.00 1.00
Continuous range 3.00 to 5.00 1.00
Continuous range 5.00 to 7.00 1.00
Continuous range 7.00 to 9.00 6.00
Continuous range 9.00 to 11.00 2.00
Continuous range 11.00 to 13.00 1.00
Continuous range 13.00 to 15.00 1.00
Continuous range 15.00 to 17.00 3.00
Continuous range 17.00 to 19.00 1.00
Continuous range 21.00 to 23.00 1.00
Continuous range 31.00 to 33.00 1.00
Total Relative Probability 21.00
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 Custom  distribution with parameters: Relative Prob.
Continuous range -12.00 to -9.00 2.00
Continuous range -6.00 to -3.00 2.00
Continuous range 0.00 to 3.00 1.00
Continuous range 3.00 to 6.00 1.00
Continuous range 6.00 to 9.00 2.00
Continuous range 9.00 to 12.00 1.00
Continuous range 15.00 to 18.00 1.00
Continuous range 18.00 to 21.00 1.00
Continuous range 21.00 to 24.00 4.00
Continuous range 27.00 to 30.00 1.00
Continuous range 30.00 to 33.00 3.00
Continuous range 33.00 to 36.00 1.00
Continuous range 36.00 to 39.00 1.00
Total Relative Probability 21.00
Assumption:  S-fund
Cell:  N3
 Custom  distribution with parameters: Relative Prob.
Continuous range -16.00 to -12.00 2.00
Continuous range -12.00 to -8.00 1.00
Continuous range -4.00 to 0.00 4.00
Continuous range 8.00 to 12.00 3.00
Continuous range 12.00 to 16.00 2.00
Continuous range 16.00 to 20.00 1.00
Continuous range 20.00 to 24.00 2.00
Continuous range 24.00 to 28.00 2.00
Continuous range 32.00 to 36.00 3.00
Continuous range 40.00 to 44.00 1.00
Total Relative Probability 21.00
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 Custom  distribution with parameters: Relative Prob.
Continuous range -28.00 to -22.00 1.00
Continuous range -22.00 to -16.00 1.00
Continuous range -16.00 to -10.00 2.00
Continuous range -4.00 to 2.00 3.00
Continuous range 2.00 to 8.00 3.00
Continuous range 8.00 to 14.00 3.00
Continuous range 20.00 to 26.00 2.00
Continuous range 26.00 to 32.00 3.00
Continuous range 32.00 to 38.00 1.00
Continuous range 56.00 to 62.00 1.00
Continuous range 62.00 to 68.00 1.00
Total Relative Probability 21.00
End of Assumptions
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APPENDIX J DETAILED REPORT OF MODEL OUTPUT FOR 
‘WHAT IF’ SCENARIO 
Crystal Ball Report
Simulation started on 5/16/02 at 11:30:40
Simulation stopped on 5/16/02 at 11:32:56
Forecast: 30 year O-7 Accumulation Cell:  I37
Summary:
Certainty Level is 69.84%
Certainty Range is from $2,273,619 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $1,180,066 to $4,562,190 
Entire Range is from $1,180,066 to $7,304,674 














Mean Std. Error $14,263.74
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$1,180,066 $2,025,597 $2,871,128 $3,716,659 $4,562,190



















Forecast: 30 year E-9 Accumulation Cell:  Q37
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.04%
Certainty Range is from $1,204,831 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $625,641 to $2,416,951 
Entire Range is from $623,870 to $3,844,361 














Mean Std. Error $7,553.23  
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$625,641 $1,073,469 $1,521,296 $1,969,124 $2,416,951




Forecast:  20 year O-5 Probability for TSP Only option Cell:  Z77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 37.16%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($142,371,112) to $124,650,048 
Entire Range is from ($150,849,824) to $344,874,950 














Mean Std. Error $1,015,622.15
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($142,371,112) ($75,615,822) ($8,860,532) $57,894,758 $124,650,048



















Forecast: 20 year O-5 Accumulation Cell:  Z27
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.00%
Certainty Range is from $719,211 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $454,603 to $1,217,896 
Entire Range is from $451,297 to $1,701,837 














Mean Std. Error $3,046.42  
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$454,603 $645,426 $836,250 $1,027,073 $1,217,896




Forecast:  20 year E-8 Accumulation Cell:  AH27
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.24%
Certainty Range is from $379,582 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from $240,823 to $641,087 
Entire Range is from $238,936 to $893,993 














Mean Std. Error $1,594.94
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$240,823 $340,889 $440,955 $541,021 $641,087



















Forecast: 20 year E-8 Probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  AH77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 34.68%
Certainty Range is from $0 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($72,146,135) to $61,138,210 
Entire Range is from ($81,999,432) to $178,210,744 














Mean Std. Error $531,209.31
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($72,146,135) ($38,825,049) ($5,503,962) $27,817,124 $61,138,210




Forecast: 30 year E-9 probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  Q77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.44%
Certainty Range is from $27,253,666 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($16,310,419) to $162,720,068 
Entire Range is from ($23,683,845) to $283,936,109 














Mean Std. Error $804,970.16
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($16,310,419) $28,447,202 $73,204,824 $117,962,446 $162,720,068



















Forecast: 30 year O-7 probability for TSP Only Option Cell:  I77
Summary:
Certainty Level is 70.36%
Certainty Range is from $41,065,606 to +Infinity  
Display Range is from ($43,809,235) to $291,223,031 
Entire Range is from ($57,622,602) to $528,306,754 














Mean Std. Error $1,495,817.32  
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($43,809,235) $39,948,832 $123,706,898 $207,464,964 $291,223,031
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